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Why Elite-College Admissions Matter

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › newsletters › archive › 2023 › 07 › elite-colleges-diversity-chetty-study › 674826

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Attendance at an elite college increases a student’s chances of joining America’s most elite ranks, according to a new study. I chatted with my colleague Annie Lowrey, who reported on this new research yesterday, about how to diversify the student bodies of America’s wealthiest schools—and, by extension, the whole of elite America.

First, here are three new stories from The Atlantic:

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A Propulsive Quality

A new study by a group of economists found what might seem to be an obvious correlation: Attending an elite school ups a person’s chances of ascending the ranks of elite society. The study, conducted by Raj Chetty of Harvard, David Deming of Harvard, and John Friedman of Brown University, looked at waitlisted students’ outcomes and showed that compared with attending one of America’s best public colleges, attending a member of what’s known as the “Ivy Plus” group—the Ivies plus Stanford, MIT, Duke, and the University of Chicago—increases a student’s chances of reaching the top of the earnings distribution at age 33 by 60 percent.

The finding is not actually so obvious. Over the past two decades, a body of research has shown that students’ average incomes end up about the same after they graduate from a flagship public institution versus an Ivy Plus school. The new study confirms this finding about average incomes, but it complicates the bigger picture: When it comes to other metrics of life in the American elite—“Supreme Court clerkships, going to a tippy-top graduate program, making it into the top 1 percent of earners at the age of 33”—schools such as Harvard and Yale matter a lot. “In general, [elite schools have] this propulsive quality,” Annie told me.

White students and, to an even greater extent, wealthy students are overrepresented at many elite colleges, and the question of how these schools can diversify has become even more urgent since the Supreme Court’s decision to curtail affirmative action. But this new study suggests that elite schools can enact some straightforward policies to diversify themselves and, in the process, the makeup of elite America. Annie and I talked through two of these possibilities.

Disbanding legacy admissions: Systems that give preference to the children of university alumni have come under scrutiny in recent years, and this scrutiny has intensified since last month’s Supreme Court ruling. Today, the Education Department said it has opened a civil-rights investigation into Harvard’s legacy-admissions practices. And last week, Wesleyan University (my own alma mater) declared an end to its use of legacy preferences.

The new paper from Chetty and his co-authors confirms that the effects of legacy admissions are real, and that they’re particularly strong for the highest-income students. The data show that legacy students whose parents are in the top 1 percent of the earnings distribution are 5 times more likely to be admitted to an Ivy Plus school compared with non-legacy students with equivalent test scores. Meanwhile, less wealthy legacy students are 3 times more likely to be admitted.

When I asked Annie if she thought the decline of legacy admissions at elite schools is a real possibility (MIT is the only school out of the Ivy Plus group studied that doesn’t use legacy preferences), she noted that this is quickly becoming a public-policy issue: President Joe Biden came out against the practice after the Supreme Court ruling, and according to polling, about three-quarters of Americans think colleges shouldn’t use legacy preferences. Universities might start to rethink their use of the practice if their presidents start getting asked about it over and over again, Annie said, “and if you start to have members of Congress saying, ‘Do we need to be giving these institutions all of this research funding and all of these nice tax breaks if they’re just picking rich kids and giving them more advantage?’”

President Biden is a particularly interesting political figure for this moment: As Annie reminded me, Biden was purportedly not a very good student, and he did not attend an elite college, as many past presidents did (he went to the University of Delaware). Meanwhile, many members of Congress come from elite colleges themselves, Annie noted: “The thing that will be most interesting is if this becomes political, and for whom does it become political?”

Increasing class sizes: I asked Annie to elaborate on a surprisingly simple argument she makes at the end of her article, one that isn’t explicitly covered in the Chetty research: Elite schools might just matriculate more students. “These schools have not grown with the growth of the United States population or the population of 18-year-olds,” she told me. We pulled up the statistics together over the phone: These Ivy Plus schools graduate about 23,000 students a year combined. Meanwhile, there are about 4 million 18-year-olds in America in any given year. Of course, not all of those kids are going to go to college. But 23,000 is “a drop in the bucket,” Annie said.

These schools have tremendous financial resources—a combined endowment of more than $200 billion for those Ivy Plus schools. Moreover, many of these schools spend lavishly on what are essentially “real-estate concerns,” such as sports facilities and dining halls, Annie said: “The notion that they couldn’t be educating many, many, many more kids is risible.”

Related:

Why you have to care about these 12 colleges A big problem with college admissions could be about to get worse.

Today’s News

The International Brotherhood of Teamsters has called off a nationwide strike threat after securing a tentative five-year agreement with UPS leadership. Qin Gang was ousted from his role as China’s foreign minister after a month-long absence from public view. His predecessor will replace him. A federal judge struck down the Biden administration’s new asylum policy, which has reduced illegal crossings on the southern border.

Evening Read

Justin Renteria

Power Causes Brain Damage

By Jerry Useem (From 2017)

If power were a prescription drug, it would come with a long list of known side effects. It can intoxicate. It can corrupt. It can even make Henry Kissinger believe that he’s sexually magnetic. But can it cause brain damage?

When various lawmakers lit into John Stumpf at a congressional hearing last fall, each seemed to find a fresh way to flay the now-former CEO of Wells Fargo for failing to stop some 5,000 employees from setting up phony accounts for customers. But it was Stumpf’s performance that stood out. Here was a man who had risen to the top of the world’s most valuable bank, yet he seemed utterly unable to read a room.

Read the full article.

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Katherine Hu contributed to this newsletter.

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The Two Players Who Tell the Story of U.S. Women’s Soccer

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › culture › archive › 2023 › 07 › womens-world-cup-2023-nwsl-megan-rapinoe-alyssa-thompson › 674816

In 2019, I stood in a bar in Atlanta, Georgia, surrounded by hundreds of other people adorned in red, blue, and white. It was the semifinals of the Women’s World Cup, and the United States was playing against England. The U.S. women were looking to go on to the final, but this would be no easy feat.

The game moved back and forth: The U.S. scored in the first 10 minutes of the match, and the English scored about 10 minutes later. Then, 31 minutes in, the U.S. captain, Alex Morgan, cut across an English defender and headed in the game-winning goal. She celebrated by pretending to sip a cup of tea. The Atlanta bar went wild, perhaps just as much for the trolling celebration as for the goal. A friend of mine, who spends far more of his time watching the NFL and NBA than women’s soccer, turned to me and said, “This is the most fun I’ve ever had watching sports in my life!”

The U.S. would go on to defeat the Netherlands in the final to win its fourth World Cup. But the 2019 tournament was also a special turning point for women’s soccer in America. It’s clear, looking back, that the emotional investment of so many American fans was tied not only to the team’s accomplishments on the field, but also to the national and sporting politics of the moment. For many, Megan Rapinoe, the star of that World Cup who continuously spoke out against homophobia, racism, and sexism, became a symbolic counterweight to the Trump administration. Watching the top women’s soccer player in the world (Rapinoe would officially win the Best FIFA Women’s Player award a few months later) adorned in the colors and crest of the United States provided many fans with a sense of pride in their country after years of political tumult. The success of the women’s team also coincided with their legal fight to be paid equally to the men’s team. Throughout the tournament, many people got the sense that cheering for the national team also meant rooting for the effort to close the gap between men and women in other areas of American life.

[Read: The Women’s World Cup is about more than soccer]

If the 2019 women’s team represented a soccer culture in flux, this year’s squad speaks to something else: how the women’s game in the United States has never been more stable than it is today.

Rapinoe, now 38 and playing in her fourth World Cup, has announced that this will be her last tournament and that she will retire from professional soccer at the end of her domestic season. Rapinoe is the squad’s oldest player, and her journey has been long. After she left the University of Portland, she decided to go professional in 2009. She became the second overall pick of the inaugural Women’s Professional Soccer league at a time when the average salary of a professional women’s player in the U.S. was roughly $25,000. Just a year later, her team folded, and only two years after that, the entire league suspended operations. Rapinoe then played in Australia and France, and even in an amateur league, before joining the newly formed National Women’s Soccer League in the U.S. in 2013. She has played for OL Reign (formerly the Seattle Reign FC) ever since.

Now consider Rapinoe’s teammate, Alyssa Thompson. She is 18 years old, currently in her first season in the NWSL, and, as of Friday’s 3–0 win against Vietnam, the second-youngest player ever to represent the country in a World Cup.

The gap between the experience of the youngest and oldest members of the team tells the story of women’s soccer in the United States. The NWSL is now in its 11th season. The league and the players have their first-ever collective-bargaining agreement, which includes an increase in player salaries, free housing, health insurance, 401(k)s, and formal parental leave. (The new agreement also put in place new protocols for player safety, something that took on an additional, urgent importance following a 2022 report that found that emotional abuse and sexual misconduct were a systemic issue in the league.) More than 1 million fans attended NWSL matches last season. And this season, the average attendance on the opening night beat the league’s previous attendance record by nearly 50 percent.

Thompson’s team, Angel City FC, based in Los Angeles, represents an unprecedented level of success and optimism for women’s professional soccer. The team is owned by a conglomerate of high-profile celebrities including Natalie Portman, America Ferrera, Eva Longoria, and Serena Williams, as well as former soccer greats such as Mia Hamm, Abby Wambach, Julie Foudy, and Shannon Boxx. Their games have been attended by Hollywood stars and have an average home attendance of nearly 20,000 people a game this season, which is higher than the average of more than a dozen Major League Soccer men’s teams. HBO produced a three-part documentary about the team this past May. As of last year, the team reportedly has a valuation of $100 million, twice as much as any other team in the league.

Though she is just in her first professional season, Thompson is quickly becoming the face of the franchise. Michael Holzer has been the private coach of Thompson and her sister Gisele (a year younger and a member of the U.S. Women’s Youth National Team) for the past two and a half years. He told me that Thompson was born with a natural gift for soccer but has also competed against boys and older women since she was about 13 years old. Of both sisters, he said, “I would often put them with adult college players or adult pro players to really test and challenge them.” Holzer also said that many of his sessions with the sisters would begin at 5:30 a.m., before school started, and that the two have pushed each other to a higher level. “They’re so disciplined. That’s what separates them, beyond their talent,” he said. He added something else that differentiates Thompson: “She is also incredibly fast.” (Even that might be an understatement. Thompson ran the 100-meter dash her junior year of high school in 11.69 seconds, one of the fastest times in the state, despite making track practice only periodically because of soccer.)

Thompson hadn’t originally intended to go pro this early. She had committed to Stanford, a longtime powerhouse in women’s soccer that has served as an incubator for future national-team players. But Holzer said that plans changed for Thompson following her national-team debut last year. In October 2022, when she was still in her senior year of high school, she made her first appearance for the U.S. Women’s National Team (USWNT), subbing in for the player she had long admired, Rapinoe. “I think that experience showed her and her family that she’s ready,” Holzer told me. Angel City thought she was ready too, and spent nearly half a million dollars to ensure their selection of Thompson as the first overall pick in the 2023 NWSL draft this January.

Thompson has already shown why Angel City made such a big bet on her. Eleven minutes into her NWSL debut this past March, she received a pass from her teammate on the left side of the field, dropped her shoulder, let the ball run across the front of her body, and fired a shot from about 20 yards out into the top right-hand corner of the net. She became the second-youngest player in the league to score in a debut, and the fourth youngest to score any NWSL goal. She was still two months away from her high-school graduation. A couple of months later, she became the first teenager to make a USWNT roster since 1995.

Still, it is difficult to overstate the amount of groundwork that has been laid for players like Thompson by the athletes who came before them. When Thompson was growing up, many women who played professional soccer had to take on other jobs, most teams struggled to have even a few thousand people show up to games, and little protected the players from exploitation and abuse. The NWSL is still growing, and more can be done to support its athletes, but the landscape of U.S. women’s soccer today is radically different from Rapinoe’s early days. Thompson is acutely aware of this. “I feel like I was born at the right time, because the women’s game is growing so much right now,” she said in a Players’ Tribune interview alongside her Angel City teammate Christen Press, a veteran of the USWNT and winner of two World Cups. Referring to Press, she said, “All the players like you and past national-team players made it to where it is now, and it’s honestly amazing, because this would not be an option” before. In particular, she talked about her amazement at substituting for Rapinoe in her debut: “I could not stop thinking about going in, like, I can’t believe I’m here.”

Thompson isn’t the only one here—a whole new generation of young women are at this year’s World Cup. There’s 21-year-old Trinity Rodman, who has reportedly signed the most lucrative contract in NWSL history, and there’s 22-year-old Sophia Smith, the reigning U.S. Women’s Player of the Year, who scored twice in the opening game against Vietnam. These women, and others, represent the present and future of the U.S. national team. It is a legacy they intend to protect.

A Controversial Model for America’s Climate Future

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › science › archive › 2023 › 07 › tennessee-valley-authority-energy-transition-nuclear › 674729

This story seems to be about:

Photographs by Morgan Hornsby

On November 10 of last year, at a place called Paradise in western Kentucky, the Tennessee Valley Authority blew up the cooling towers of a large coal-fired power plant. The three stout towers, each 435 feet high, buckled at the waist in synchrony, then crumpled like crushed soda cans. Within 10 seconds, they’d collapsed into a billowing cloud of dust.

To anyone who watched the demolition happen, or saw the footage online, the message was clear: TVA, a sprawling, federally owned utility created 90 years ago as part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, is getting off coal.

Though some people in the region regret that move, it’s a win for the local environment—and for the global climate. In the past few years, as the urgency of slowing climate change has grown, something like a consensus has emerged on how to do it: Green the electrical grid while retooling as much of the economy as possible—cars, buildings, factories—to run on zero-carbon electricity. The Inflation Reduction Act, signed by President Joe Biden last August, is supporting that plan with $370 billion in subsidies. In a 2021 executive order, Biden directed the federal government to “lead by example in order to achieve a carbon pollution–free electricity sector by 2035” and a net-zero economy by 2050.

Given this strategy, electric utilities are crucial to our future—and none more so than TVA, the largest public power provider in the United States. Its territory covers nearly all of Tennessee; large chunks of Alabama, Mississippi, and Kentucky; and bits of three other states. In one of the most conservative regions of the country, 10 million people get electricity from a federal agency that has no shareholders to answer to and no profits to make.

“TVA is this crazy unicorn—it’s not like anything else,” Stephen Smith, the executive director of the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, told me. As a federal agency responsible not just for promoting the clean-energy transition but for building it, TVA is positioned to provide a national model—and TVA says it is doing just that.

But that’s not how Smith and other environmental advocates describe TVA’s behavior. They see a utility that is replacing coal plants, at Paradise and elsewhere, with gas-burning plants that will pollute the climate for decades. They see a utility betting heavily on small nuclear reactors that don’t yet exist. Above all, they say, TVA is failing to embrace proven clean-energy technologies, such as solar and wind power and energy-efficiency measures.

“TVA is a living laboratory that could be part of a phenomenal push to change to clean energy,” Smith said. Instead of an agency “on a war footing to get us to zero carbon,” he sees it becoming “an impediment in the executive branch.”

TVA has cut its carbon emissions by well over half since 2005, far more than the nationwide average for the electricity sector, while charging lower-than-average rates. It has done so by replacing coal with gas and by switching on a large new nuclear reactor. But like most American utilities, TVA has no plans to reach Biden’s goal of a net-zero grid by 2035; it’s targeting only an 80 percent carbon reduction by that date. “We aspire to net-zero by 2050, and we aspire to go farther, faster, if we can,” Jeff Lyash, TVA’s president and CEO since 2019, said at a meeting of the agency’s board of directors in November. With existing technology, though, he doesn’t think that’s possible.

What’s the right road to net-zero? The Tennessee Valley is an illuminating microcosm of a national debate, in which the imperative of addressing climate change is pitted against the enormous practical challenge of not only maintaining a reliable electric supply but dramatically expanding it to meet the needs of a decarbonizing economy. “TVA is in a unique position to lead in delivering the clean-energy future,” Lyash said in November. He and his critics agree on that much. But as for when that future will arrive, and what it will look like, they are very far apart indeed.  

T

VA was born from another global crisis. In 1933, when Roosevelt and Senator George Norris, a Nebraska Republican, persuaded Congress to establish TVA, the United States was at the nadir of the Great Depression, and the Tennessee Valley, where only a tiny percentage of the homes had electricity, was one of the country’s poorest regions. TVA transformed it. Starting with the Wilson Dam, at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, a series of dams controlled flooding on the Tennessee River and its tributaries and electrified the whole Valley. Hydroelectric plants still produce about 10 percent of the region’s power, carbon-free.

Private utilities hated TVA, and complained bitterly about what they saw as unfair competition. They challenged the agency’s existence before the Supreme Court and lost, twice. As late as the 1950s, President Dwight Eisenhower wanted to sell off the agency, which he saw as an example of “creeping socialism.” The agency survived by becoming quasi-independent of the federal government. The president appoints and Congress confirms TVA’s board, but since 1959, TVA has mostly done without federal appropriations. It pays its own way by selling electricity—not directly to consumers (aside from a few dozen industrial and federal properties), but to the 153 municipally or cooperatively owned local power companies, or LPCs, that distribute power to the people.

Top left: Widows Creek Steam Plant, 1961. Top Right: Wilson Dam, June 1942. Bottom: TVA directors with President John F. Kennedy in 1963. (Courtesy of National Archives Catalog)

From the start, TVA’s strategy was to make electricity cheap and accessible enough that people would use it for everything. The agency succeeded so well that demand soon outstripped what even a thoroughly dammed river could supply. In the ’50s, TVA began relying on coal as its main energy source, ultimately building 12 large power plants. Over the past decade, it has closed six, but giant piles of toxic ash remain. In 2008, a dike ruptured at the coal plant in Kingston, Tennessee, spilling more than 5 million cubic yards of ash into the Emory and Clinch Rivers.

Environmentalists have long had reason to distrust TVA. In the ’70s, when the newly created Environmental Protection Agency began regulating air pollution, TVA resisted. Accustomed to making its own engineering decisions, it argued that investing in scrubbers for its coal stacks made no sense—after all, it was about to replace most of them with nuclear reactors. But the agency completed only seven of a planned 17 reactors—demand for electricity grew slower than forecast—and today, unfinished reactor hulks lie scattered around the Valley. The fiasco left TVA constrained by debt, which still totals nearly $20 billion.

[From the April 1962 issue: Harry Caudill on TVA and the destruction of the Appalachian Mountains]

Nevertheless, TVA is proud of its nuclear fleet. Although Georgia Power is expected to bring a new reactor online soon, TVA has been the only U.S. utility to have managed that in the past three decades. It began construction on the two reactors at its Watts Bar plant, in Tennessee, in 1973; mothballed them for years; then completed them in 1996 and 2016. In the first half of 2023, they and the agency’s other reactors helped it generate nearly 60 percent of its kilowatt-hours without emitting carbon—significantly higher than the national average. But it has “fumbled, failed, and flopped” into that enviable position, Stephen Smith told me. The climate crisis demands transformative change, Smith said, and TVA has abandoned its historic mission to provide precisely that.

TVA’s Colbert gas plant, which is under construction, in Florence, Alabama, July 7, 2023 (Morgan Hornsby for The Atlantic)

In downtown Chattanooga, the people directly responsible for delivering electricity to the Valley’s 10 million residents sit in TVA’s system-operations center. It’s a large, hushed, dimly lit room, in which curving rows of workstations face a wall filled with an illuminated schematic of TVA’s sprawling transmission grid. The first rows of operators track the physical condition and voltage of the transmission lines. The operators behind them “dispatch” power as needed from hundreds of generators around the grid, matching supply to demand minute by minute. That complex job is simplified by having lots of “dispatchable” power, which is what coal, gas, nuclear, and hydro plants provide, at least in principle: power that’s available any time of the day or year.

In a conference room overlooking the control room, I met Greg Henrich and Aaron Melda, TVA’s vice president and senior vice president for transmission and power supply. Melda had helped formulate the agency’s decarbonization strategy, and he grabbed a marker to sketch out the numbers on a flip chart. The strategy’s central element is the closure of TVA’s last five coal plants, all more than 50 years old, by 2035. “Over the same period, we will add 10,000 megawatts of solar,” Melda said. To store energy for when the sun isn’t shining, TVA will also add 1,000 megawatts of battery capacity.

Over the next decade, though, the agency’s main carbon-reduction strategy is to build more gas plants—7,000 megawatts’ worth, roughly the capacity of the current coal fleet. When I visited the system-ops center last fall, TVA was finalizing plans for the latest addition: a 1,450-megawatt gas plant in Cumberland City, Tennessee, at the site of its biggest coal plant, whose two generating units are scheduled to retire in 2026 and 2028. Environmentalists strenuously opposed the gas plant—even the EPA questioned it—arguing that it would commit TVA to emitting carbon long past 2035 or even 2050. In the near term, though, the switch from coal will substantially reduce emissions of carbon and other pollutants. “You replace coal with gas, you’ve now taken every one of those megawatts down 50 percent in its carbon intensity,” Melda said.

Why not just build more batteries and more solar, and take the intensity down to zero? It would cost a lot more, Melda said, and batteries discharge within several hours. A few rainy days could leave you unable to meet demand. Nor is solar a big help on dark winter mornings, which are the moments that TVA worries about most. The majority of homes in the Valley have electric heat. A spokesperson for TVA, Scott Fiedler, later said that gas is “the only mature technology that allows us to quickly add renewable energy and maintain the low cost and reliability” needed.

I visited the system-ops center on a chilly November day a week before Thanksgiving. Early that morning, as people cranked up their thermostat, TVA had seen a fairly typical winter peak in the load on its grid. Warmer weather was coming that would drive down demand, Henrich said, but it would rise again on Thanksgiving morning, as people roasted turkeys. That afternoon, the load would plummet. “Everybody’s asleep on the couch,” Henrich said. “It’s awesome to watch—it’s truly societal behavior driving your load.”

He opened the blinds on the conference-room windows so we could see into the control room itself. It looked pretty quiet, with a lot of the workstations empty. “When does it ever get exciting?” I asked. A month later, my question was answered.

Aaron Melda (left) and Greg Henrich, TVA’s vice president and senior vice president for transmission and power supply, at TVA’s main headquarters, in Chattanooga, July 6, 2023 (Morgan Hornsby for The Atlantic)

On December 23, people in the Tennessee Valley awoke to temperatures that had plunged 40 degrees or more overnight. Worse, both units of the Cumberland coal plant had shut down, because thick ice from a big storm had encased instruments on the exposed boilers. In the morning, the Bull Run coal plant wouldn’t start, and some natural-gas plants failed too. As demand soared to an all-time winter record of 33,427 megawatts, the operators in Chattanooga found themselves about 8,000 megawatts short. Neighboring utilities couldn’t help; the storm had affected half the country.

For two hours that morning, TVA had to instruct its 153 local power companies to cut demand by 5 percent. On Christmas Eve, it asked for a 10 percent cut for more than five hours. To comply, the LPCs shut off power neighborhood by neighborhood for 15 minutes or more at a time. The rolling blackouts were the first in TVA’s 90-year history. At Christmas dinner, Fiedler told me, his mother required him to explain why his storied organization had cut her power on the holiday. “She wore me out,” he said.

TVA likes to boast of its reliability, and environmental advocates seized on the Christmas failure. “The emperor has no clothes,” Amanda Garcia, the director of the Southern Environmental Law Center’s Tennessee office, told me. “The winter storm to me provided a perfect example of why TVA needs to change”—by showing that fossil fuels are no guarantee of reliability and that it should be transitioning to renewables faster. The Sierra Club ranks TVA among the very worst American utilities for its energy transition. The Center for Biological Diversity calls it a “climate laggard.” Both want the agency to replace all its coal plants as soon as possible with renewable energy, not gas.

A modeling study released in March by the Center for Biological Diversity and by GridLab, a nonprofit consulting group, concluded that TVA could indeed stop burning both coal and gas by 2035. To do that, it would need to build the equivalent of about 145 large solar farms, with a total capacity of 35 gigawatts, in its territory, along with the transmission lines needed to import about 12 gigawatts of wind power from the Midwest. (The Valley isn’t windy enough to produce cost-effective wind power.) Then, by 2050, it would have to nearly triple that expansion again in order to electrify and decarbonize the Valley’s economy. The goals are ambitious, given the delays that now plague many renewable and transmission projects—but the benefits to society would dwarf the costs, the study found. Consumers would save more than $250 billion, mostly from switching to cars that run on TVA’s electricity rather than gasoline. Carbon emissions would drop by hundreds of millions of tons.

The first step toward a clean-energy future, advocates agree, would be to reduce energy waste in the Valley. About a quarter of homes there rely on resistance heating—the method employed in electric furnaces and space heaters. Many heat pumps also fall back on it at freezing temperatures, Huntsville Utilities’ president and CEO, Wes Kelley, told me. “That is basically the equivalent of turning on a bunch of big hair dryers to heat your house,” Kelley said.

According to National Renewable Energy Laboratory estimates, efficiency measures, including more and better heat pumps, could save roughly as much electricity as the Cumberland gas plant will generate. “If you reduce that resistance heating, you’re helping the system as a whole”—by reducing the peak load—“as well as the customer,” Maggie Shober, the research director at the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (SACE), told me. Because people in the Valley use so much electricity, monthly bills are high even though rates are low, creating an especially heavy burden on the poor.

Utilities generally have little incentive to invest in energy-saving measures, which only reduce their revenue. But TVA should be different: It doesn’t need to make a profit. Since 2018, it has run an admirable program, called Home Uplift, that provides heat pumps, weatherization, and other measures to low-income homeowners, all for free—but so far, only to 5,000 of the hundreds of thousands of Valley residents who might be eligible. TVA could do much more, SACE and other critics say, especially now that the Inflation Reduction Act is subsidizing energy-efficiency programs. For its part, TVA says it’s planning more of these types of investments, including rebates to replace older and less efficient heat pumps. Fiedler, the TVA spokesperson, said the agency will lower energy costs in underserved communities by $200 million over the next five years through Home Uplift and other programs.

TVA’s Wilson Dam, in Muscle Shoals, Alabama, July 7, 2023 (Morgan Hornsby for The Atlantic)

The environmental advocates I talked with were all suspicious of TVA’s clean-energy intentions. SACE’s Stephen Smith, a close observer of the agency for more than three decades, thinks TVA is building gas plants now and planning nuclear for the future because large power plants are what it is comfortable building, and it has a monopoly on building them in the Valley. The future of the industry should lie in “shifting from central stations to a more distributed model that opens up a whole new powerful toolbox for fixing the climate crisis,” Smith said. “But TVA is not going there.”

He and other advocates see a “rapidly closing window of opportunity to secure a liveable and sustainable future,” to quote the most recent United Nations climate report, and in that stark light, TVA’s current fleet of renewables looks inadequate, especially if you set aside the hydroelectric dams and focus on what it has achieved lately. It buys about 1,200 megawatts of wind from the Midwest; it has installed about 1,000 megawatts of solar capacity in the Valley. That’s far less solar power, Amanda Garcia pointed out, than deployed by utilities in the Carolinas or Georgia. Though she acknowledged TVA’s plans to expand solar over the coming decade, “actions speak louder than words,” she said.

But TVA is actually making a big effort these days, Gil Hough, the executive director of TenneSEIA, the state solar-industry association, told me. Hough worked for SACE from 2000 to 2010, promoting solar with Smith. Now he helps deliver it to TVA.

In the mid-2010s, he told me, the agency did indeed walk away from solar because it was focused on paying down its nuclear debt. Under Lyash, though, TVA has changed, Hough said. It may have only 1,000 megawatts of solar online—but it has more than 2,200 under construction or contracted. “TVA wants every megawatt we can provide them right now,” Hough said. “It’s us who’s holding them back.” Supply-chain disruptions have slowed solar projects and raised prices. But Lyash announced in May that TVA would award contracts this year for 6,000 megawatts of solar power, to be brought online between 2026 and 2029. “We are building as much solar as we can get panels for,” he said.

What got TVA’s attention was the demand from large corporations, says Reagan Farr, the CEO of the Nashville-based Silicon Ranch, which owns and operates solar farms for TVA and other utilities. Farr told me that companies like Google and Meta, by insisting on renewable energy, convinced TVA that it could no longer fulfill its mission of economic development without expanding its solar capacity. “The power of these large companies—their procurement decisions drive actions,” Farr said.

Local resistance to solar farms is a growing problem, both TVA and the industry say. At the November TVA board meeting, Chief Operating Officer Don Moul announced a $216 million plan to build a 100-megawatt solar plant on top of the coal-ash pile at the Shawnee power plant, in Kentucky. If it works, Moul said, as much as 1,000 megawatts of solar might one day rise from ash piles around the region—poetic justice, and a way to “alleviate some of the land challenges that we’ve heard about from so many of our stakeholders,” Moul said.

One of TVA’s key constituencies are the local power companies that distribute its electricity. Their perspective is often very different from that of environmental advocates. At a listening session before a February 2023 board meeting in Muscle Shoals, a dozen of their representatives got up to speak—not about renewables or climate change, but about the blackouts. They were a “black eye for all of us in the Valley,” said Brian Solsbee, the executive director of the Tennessee Municipal Electric Power Association and a former TVA employee. “How does TVA ensure it never happens again?” It needs new generation capacity, Huntsville Utilities’ Wes Kelley told me.

When it was Lyash’s turn to speak, he said what he has said repeatedly: that TVA plans to use all available technologies to decarbonize. He promised a renewed focus on energy efficiency and an aggressive expansion of solar—but also of gas and, in the long run, nuclear. “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket,” he said. Renewables, in his view, are one basket.

TVA’s Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, in Rhea County, Tennessee, June 30, 2023 (Morgan Hornsby for The Atlantic)

The Tennessee Valley is going through a period of economic expansion that would make Roosevelt proud, and TVA, with its reputation for cheap and reliable power, is partly responsible. The Valley’s new growth includes electric-vehicle, battery, and solar-panel manufacturers—the industries that will drive the electrification of America. When I first met Lyash in Chattanooga, where he had just presented TVA’s Engineer of the Year award, he rattled off some of the names. “Ford, GM, Toyota, Mazda, Volkswagen, LG, SK—those industries are going to decarbonize transportation,” he said. “So we have to provide them the energy now.” Demand is growing already, and Lyash expects it potentially to double by 2050. A study last year by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), which mapped how the grid might be decarbonized by 2035, in line with Biden’s goal, assumed that demand might even double by then.

The decision to build a new gas plant at Cumberland comes in that context as well as that of climate urgency. In TVA’s view, even if it could build enough additional renewables and transmission lines to replace the Cumberland coal unit it plans to retire by 2026, which it says it can’t, solar and wind wouldn’t offer “firm, dispatchable power”—power that’s available regardless of weather or time of day. The basic problem, as the NREL report explains, is “seasonal mismatch”: There’s not enough sunlight to meet peak demand on cold winter mornings and not enough wind on hot summer afternoons; both can be minimal for days.

Given this reality, is it reasonable to build a new gas plant today, even though it will emit some carbon for years to come? I put the question to Paul Denholm, a senior research fellow at NREL and the lead author of the recent study. “That is a fantastic question, and it’s something everybody is trying to figure out,” he said.

All visions of a decarbonized grid and of an electrified, net-zero society require huge expansions of wind and solar power. But the NREL study foresees that a net-zero grid will also need some kind of gas to meet peak demand. In three of its four net-zero scenarios, turbines are still burning substantial amounts of natural gas in 2035, and the carbon is being captured rather than released into the atmosphere. In all scenarios, many gas turbines are retrofitted to burn zero-carbon hydrogen.

TVA’s vision of the future, as Lyash and Aaron Melda explained it to me, aligns broadly with the NREL study. Any gas plants that TVA builds now, they said, will one day either burn “green hydrogen” or involve carbon capture—neither is in wide use yet, and TVA is investing in both. The reason TVA won’t promise a net-zero grid by 2035, Lyash said, is because “it’s going to take deploying technologies that are not currently available at a price people can afford and a scale that can be implemented.” The NREL study assumes that those technologies will be developed in time to reach net zero by 2035; TVA doesn’t want to count on that.

It’s no surprise, Denholm said, that utilities are struggling to figure out how to cut the last 10 to 20 percent of their carbon emissions. NREL researchers haven’t figured it out either. “The fact that you have conservative utilities saying they know how to [cut] 80 percent—that is a really remarkable shift,” he told me. “I think we need to recognize that and applaud it.”

Another influential report, Princeton’s 2021 “Net-Zero America” study, included a scenario in which only renewable energy was allowed: By 2050, wind turbines were visible from about one-eighth of the area of the Lower 48 states, solar farms covered an area the size of West Virginia, and long-distance transmission lines mushroomed to five times their existing capacity. Even when such facilities share land with other uses—Silicon Ranch, for instance, allows sheep to graze or pollinator gardens to bloom among the solar panels—they are a significant industrial intrusion on the landscape.

In some regions, people may prefer less of those—and more of the compact central power stations that TVA knows how to build. The NREL and Princeton studies both include net-zero scenarios in which the expansion of renewable facilities and transmission lines is constrained, perhaps by “challenges with siting and land use,” as NREL puts it. Both scenarios rely, as does TVA, on nuclear plants. “I can’t make the numbers work without new nuclear,” Lyash told me.

Like many nuclear engineers these days, he thinks the future lies in small modular reactors, or SMRs. At a site on the Clinch River, TVA is planning the first of what it hopes will be a fleet of 20 or so identical SMRs, using a relatively conventional design. “Our goal is not just to build a plant, but to build a plant that sets the model for the U.S. industry,” Greg Boerschig, one of the engineers running the TVA effort, told me.

The way environmentalists focus on TVA’s renewable capacity or lack thereof frustrates Lyash. “The point is,” he said, “what are your carbon emissions, and what’s your price, and what’s your reliability?” Different regions with different starting points—Arizona has a lot of sunshine, Oklahoma has wind, TVA has a legacy of nuclear and hydro—might reach their clean-energy goals in different ways.

Toward the end of our last conversation, Lyash opened an app on his phone that shows real-time carbon emissions from electricity generation. “One of the countries that gets held up as having deployed huge amounts of solar, and it’s a big percentage of their capacity, is Germany,” he said. “Germany’s carbon emissions right now are 426 grams per unit of electricity. And today, right now, TVA’s is 247 … And our price is less than a third of theirs.”

That happened to be a bad day for Germany’s numbers and a good one for TVA’s—but long-term data confirm Lyash’s point: Germany gets a far higher percentage of its electricity from renewables than TVA, but emits substantially more carbon per kilowatt-hour. Germany has made different choices. It closed its last nuclear reactor in April.

TVA’s Norris Dam, in Andersonville, Tennessee, June 30, 2023 (Morgan Hornsby for The Atlantic)

Environmentalists are right to be wary of TVA. In the past it has performed badly on a variety of environmental issues. It built an unnecessary dam, the Tellico, that drowned important Cherokee cultural sites and hundreds of farms and notoriously threatened to extinguish a little fish, the snail darter. (The darter has since recovered.) It stepped back from solar and energy-efficiency efforts when it could have led the way. It was slow to reduce air pollution from its coal plants—which are still lethal polluters—and allowed the major coal-ash disaster in Kingston to happen. This May, even as Lyash was promising 6,000 megawatts of new renewable energy, TVA doubled down on its Cumberland decision: It released a draft environmental-impact statement saying that it also wanted to replace the Kingston plant with gas power by the end of 2027. That will lock in higher emissions for longer, environmentalists say.

Garcia and Smith think TVA lacks public accountability. They point out that it has no independent public-service commission to regulate it, only a board that, like corporate boards, has no staff of its own and thus depends on management. They would like to loosen TVA’s monopoly and free local power companies to buy power elsewhere, bridling the “unicorn” with market discipline.

But that would risk undermining the very thing that makes the agency such a precious unicorn: the public-power model. TVA has retained political support, at least in its sphere, for an active government role in improving people’s lives. And in a region where environmental causes are hardly unifying, TVA has said, publicly and repeatedly, that it wants to stop emitting carbon as fast as it can. How it does that should be debated—but in many conversations with TVA and its critics, I never heard a solid reason to doubt its good faith.

As I traveled the Tennessee Valley, I visited monuments from TVA’s golden age, including Wilson Dam, in northwestern Alabama, with its lofty, sunlit turbine hall and arches like a Roman aqueduct’s, and Norris Dam, in northeastern Tennessee, which closes off the narrow Clinch River with a tall, sculptural curve. TVA engineers and the people of this region built these marvels “for generations yet unborn,” as Senator George Norris liked to say,  with no notion of how valuable they would become in an age of climate change.

Now it’s time to build more.

This article is part of the Atlantic Planet series supported by the HHMI Department of Science Education.

Oppenheimer’s Cry of Despair in The Atlantic

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › technology › archive › 2023 › 07 › j-robert-oppenheimer-ideas-history › 674814

In February of 1949, J. Robert Oppenheimer, the former director of Los Alamos Laboratory under the Manhattan Project, took to the pages of this magazine to write about a terrible defeat. Nearly four years had passed since the Manhattan Project had detonated the first atomic bomb in New Mexico. The explosion had flashed purple light onto the surrounding mountains and raised a 40,000-foot pillar of flame, smoke, and debris from the desert floor. But for Oppenheimer, the afterglow had quickly dimmed and been replaced by an existential hangover of the first order.

[From February 1949: J. Robert Oppenheimer’s ‘The Open Mind’]

The most gutting stretch of Christopher Nolan’s new Oppenheimer biopic occurs when the great scientist, played by Cillian Murphy, begins to experience the disenchantment that would haunt him for the rest of his life. As he watches two bombs rumble away on trucks from his desert lab toward Japan, any illusion that their terrible power is under his control is punctured. Hiroshima was bombed three weeks after the Trinity test. In the film, a sickened Oppenheimer averts his gaze from photos of its disfigured victims. Like Nolan’s camera, he cannot bear to look.

Oppenheimer would later say that through the bomb, physicists had come to know sin. Having plucked a dangerous fruit from the tree of knowledge, they consigned themselves—and all of humanity—to a fallen world, tormented by the constant possibility of self-extinction. In the war’s immediate aftermath, Oppenheimer consoled, or perhaps deceived, himself that his invention’s apocalyptic potential could and would be contained, in part through his efforts.

Oppenheimer had reason to believe in his influence. The public had embraced his personal legend: Inflamed by a fear of a nuclear-armed Hitler, he had ventured into the invisible realm of atoms and returned with a tremendous power, capable of stopping a war cold and returning sons to their mothers. Honors were heaped upon him. In Nolan’s film, we watch as Oppenheimer is courted for a plush role: director of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, the academic home of Albert Einstein. Oppenheimer also chaired the committee tasked with advising the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. During the latter half of the 1940s, his pronouncements on matters of science had a singular gravitas. “Certainly he knows as much about the potential of atomic energy as any living American,” reads an editor’s note atop his essay for The Atlantic.

What did he do with this outsize voice? He opposed the development of a much more powerful, second-generation atom weapon—the hydrogen bomb, which Edward Teller called the “super”—in part because he was concerned it would accelerate an arms race with the Soviet Union. He also lent his prestige and credibility to ongoing efforts to avoid that arms race altogether. He helped draft the proposals that evolved into the Baruch Plan, an arms-control regime that the United States put before the United Nations. Under the latter’s direction, all countries would forfeit their atomic-weapons programs, and atomic energy would be a global collective good, administered by a centralized regulatory body at the UN, over which no country would enjoy a veto.

[Read: We have no nuclear strategy]

After the final failure of these proposals at the UN, in 1948, Oppenheimer turned, as one does, to The Atlantic. His essay is a fascinating historical artifact and act of public grief. Titled “The Open Mind,” it lays out Oppenheimer’s account of the back-and-forth over arms-control proposals. Soviet leaders had voted against them, but their response had not been wholly negative. They agreed that all countries should dismantle their atomic-weapons programs and that atomic energy should fall under international oversight. But they objected, perhaps understandably, to America’s insistence on keeping its weapons program running until the new system was functional. They wanted President Harry Truman to disarm first, a condition that he could not abide.

During the Manhattan Project, Oppenheimer’s powers of foresight had failed him. However accurate his calculations concerning the innards of the atom, he’d misjudged what would happen geopolitically after he and his colleagues wrenched it apart. Out of naivete, or the expedient blindness of ambition, or some combination of the two, he may have believed that he could stop its further use after the Nazis had been defeated, or that the terrifying spectacle of the bomb would eventually lead to a renunciation of ever larger weapons and wars.

In 1949, he understood that no such renunciation was in store. “We see no clear course before us that would persuade the governments of the world to join with us” in atomic disarmament, he wrote. This time, the implications were obvious, and they implicated America, which, as Oppenheimer laments, “responded by adopting some of the very measures that we had hoped might be universally renounced.” The mass manufacture of the atomic bomb was under way and American scientists had clear orders to put the new physics in service of even more destructive weapons.

Oppenheimer saw a cosmically bleak arms race taking shape, and this time his  foresight proved accurate. Within months, the Soviet Union successfully tested its first atomic bomb, and only three years later, in 1952, the United States detonated a hydrogen bomb roughly 500 times as powerful as the one that had largely destroyed Nagasaki. The Soviets followed suit a few years later, and by the time of Oppenheimer’s death, in 1967, the two countries had nearly 40,000 nuclear weapons between them, many of them set on a hair trigger.

[Read: Never give artificial intelligence the nuclear codes]

Oppenheimer knew that he’d helped to conjure this world into existence. He sought to prepare our readers for its horrors. In the main, his advice was to not lose hope, and to remember that our imagination of the future is limited. Oppenheimer was perhaps heartened by the quantum world, shot through as it is with uncertainty, that had captivated him in his youth. He seemed to draw strength from a belief that the macro world of human affairs is likewise contingent, such that nothing about our fate is ever settled.

Oppenheimer quotes from a speech that Abraham Lincoln gave in Baltimore three years into the Civil War. At the beginning of that conflict, few expected that “domestic slavery would be much affected,” Lincoln said, and yet it had been. Reality is unpredictable; it will surprise you. Lincoln reminded Oppenheimer that surprises swing both ways. A world that appears to be fallen can sometimes veer toward moral progress.

We have seen such swerves before, even in the nuclear realm. By the 1980s, enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons appeared to be a fact of life on planet Earth. In 1986, the Soviet Union’s stockpile reached an all-time high of about 40,000 warheads, and the United States had more than 20,000. Very few people imagined that the end of the Cold War was imminent. Nor could many have guessed that in 1991, George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev would sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the first in an extraordinary sequence of agreements that shrank the two countries’ arsenals to less than a quarter of their previous size.

Bush and Gorbachev were wise to seize the day, because that era’s peace—and its clean two-party strategic symmetry—proved ephemeral. The specter of nuclear annihilation has since returned with force to the global collective psyche. Vladimir Putin has invoked it in speeches about his invasion of Ukraine. China has built up an arsenal that may be large enough to destroy every major American city.

[Read: What if Russia uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine?]

As Oppenheimer well understood, there is no technological reason that world-threatening stockpiles of nuclear weapons will not be with us for hundreds of thousands of years. To keep large numbers of them in place for that long, in a strategic setting where any small exchange could very easily become a large one, is to play a fool’s game. No one should feel safe because seven decades have passed without another incident of nuclear warfare; that sample size is too small.

Beyond advising hope, Oppenheimer didn’t offer much guidance as to how we might dismantle the sword of Damocles that he helped to string up above human civilization. A notorious dandy and eloquent impromptu speaker, he was always drawn to style; in his Atlantic essay, he invokes it in a higher form. “It is style,” he wrote, “which, in the domain of foreign policy, enables us to find a harmony between the pursuit of ends essential to us, and the regard for the views, the sensibilities, the aspirations of those to whom the problem may appear in another light.”

The problem Oppenheimer had in mind was arms control. He asked that those who negotiate on America’s behalf carry out their work in a spirit of openness. He asked that they appeal to the reasoning minds of those who sit across the table. He appears to have believed—or to have wanted to believe—that a widespread adoption of this style might be enough to set into motion a new evolutionary step in geopolitics, through which the world’s major powers might come to a shared understanding that peace is the highest wisdom. To this end, he counseled patience. Time and nature must be allowed to do their work, he noted. Seven decades on, it looks to be slow work indeed.

A New Kind of Fascism

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2023 › 07 › trump-second-term-isolationist-fascism › 674791

For some years, a variety of news commentators and academics have called Donald Trump a fascist. I was one of those who resisted using that term. I thought it had long been abused by casual, imprecise applications, and as a historian of Nazi Germany, I did not think Trumpism was anywhere close to crossing the threshold of that comparison. I still deny that Trump’s presidency was fascist; but I’m concerned that if he wins another trip to the White House, he could earn the label.

Fascism was most fully exemplified by the regimes of Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler. These regimes combined totalitarian dictatorship, wars of imperial conquest, and outright genocide in the case of Hitler (of Jews, Slavs, Roma) or ethnic mass murder in Mussolini’s case (of Libyans, Ethiopians, Slovenes). Placing Trumpism in the same category seemed to me trivializing and misleading.

I argued instead that Trump was more like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán or Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan than Hitler or Mussolini, and should be categorized as an “illiberal populist” rather than a fascist. And in one very important respect, Trump differed sharply from the European fascists of the interwar period.

They were ardent militarists and imperialists. War was the crucible in which the new fascist man was to be forged; territorial expansion was both the means and the end of fascist power and triumph. Trump has shown little ambition to pursue such aims. In his first term, he shamelessly abased himself before Russian President Vladimir Putin, exchanged “love letters” with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, signed the Doha Agreement with the Taliban committing the U.S. to withdrawal from Afghanistan, and petulantly sought to downgrade U.S. treaty obligations to NATO and South Korean allies that he deemed to be “delinquent” and getting a “free ride.”

Trump has continued in the same isolationist vein in recent interviews and speeches. He has railed against “globalists.” He has promised to settle the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 24 hours by cutting off aid to Kyiv if President Volodymyr Zelensky does not reach an immediate settlement with Moscow—that is, capitulate to Putin. He has disparaged Taiwan as a predator nation that stole microchip manufacturing from the U.S. (That Chinese President Xi Jinping would construe the simultaneous abandonment of Ukraine and dismissal of Taiwan as anything other than a green light to invade the latter seems improbable.)

[Christopher R. Browning: How Hitler’s enablers undid democracy in Germany]

No question, Trump inflicted grave damage on our country’s political culture, stoking toxic polarization and reveling in dishonesty. And Trumpism did exhibit distinct elements of the fascist style of politics: the inflammatory rallies; the incessant mongering of fear, grievance, and victimization; the casual endorsement of violence; the pervasive embrace of conspiracy theories; the performative cruelty; the feral instinct for targeting marginalized and vulnerable minorities; and the cult of personality. But the Trump presidency lacked any warlike, expansionist interest, and that made it decisively unlike 20th-century fascism.

Thankfully, also, Trump himself was too lazy, inexperienced, and unprepared to set about systematically constructing a true dictatorship. The main focus of the Trump presidency was less plans and programs and more the theatrics of satisfying his constant, insatiable need for attention and adulation. Everything—whether the state of the economy or the chocolate cake served to China’s Xi Jinping at Mar-a-Lago—had to be extolled as “the greatest ever.”

Until the final weeks of Trump’s term, the guardrails of American democracy seemed to hold firm. The institutions of the federal government remained relatively intact, and civil servants largely secure and uncorrupted. The United States experienced democratic backsliding but not democratic collapse.

In a second term, however, a newly emboldened Trump could well attack democracy itself. The MAGA Republican Party of his making has openly explored ways to transform states where they control all branches of government. States that were once pluralistic democracies with at least some chance of a transfer of power are coming to resemble one-party regimes directed by a minority of the population. (Anne Applebaum’s report from Tennessee is a case history in point.)

In Florida, Governor Ron DeSantis, Trump’s putative rival for the 2024 Republican nomination, has turned his state into a laboratory for testing how a determined, calculating, uninhibited authoritarian can maximize executive power. In many respects, he has already accomplished at the state level what Trump did not have the discipline and focus to do at the federal level. And DeSantis has created a blueprint for other Republican state leaders to follow.

[Shadi Hamid: Americans are losing sight of what fascism means]

Just as state Republicans have become more ruthlessly autocratic in their methods, a new Trump presidency would be much more efficiently goal-oriented  at the federal level. A huge transformation of the administrative state is being deliberately planned. The government agencies and civil service he has decried as the “deep state” would be purged or politicized, and the “retribution” he has promised against his enemies would also be carried out. The “unitary executive” theory long promoted by some Republicans would become the reality of an unabashed authoritarianism.

The very last months of the Trump presidency foreshadowed what a second term would entail. When formerly loyal vassals such as Attorney General William Barr and Defense Secretary Mark Esper demonstrated that they would not cross the line into unconstitutional insurgency, Trump sought sycophants for whom no such line existed. In a new Trump administration, total devotion to the leader would be the sole qualification for appointment.

Unlike previous fascist leaders with their cult of war, Trump still offers appeasement to dictators abroad, but he now promises something much closer to dictatorship at home. For me, what Trump is offering for his second presidency will meet the threshold, and the label I’d choose to describe it would be “isolationist fascism.” Until now, such a concept would have been an oxymoron, a historical phenomenon without precedent. Trump continues to break every mold.