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First-time retailers are leading the brick-and-mortar revival in New York

Quartz

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When the Covid-19 pandemic upended the lives of American consumers, retail storefronts in cities across the U.S. were forced close their doors. Spaces emptied out amid government-led shutdowns, and some to this day haven’t fully returned. Meanwhile, urban centers are still facing less foot traffic than they were in…

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Why We Must Resist AI’s Soft Mind Control

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2024 › 03 › artificial-intelligence-google-gemini-mind-control › 677683

Lately, I’ve been getting acquainted with Google’s new Gemini AI product. I wanted to know how it thinks. More important, I wanted to know how it could affect my thinking. So I spent some time typing queries.

For instance, I asked Gemini to give me some taglines for a campaign to persuade people to eat more meat. No can do, Gemini told me, because some public-health organizations recommend “moderate meat consumption,” because of the “environmental impact” of the meat industry, and because some people ethically object to eating meat. Instead, it gave me taglines for a campaign encouraging a “balanced diet”: “Unlock Your Potential: Explore the Power of Lean Protein.”

Gemini did not show the same compunctions when asked to create a tagline for a campaign to eat more vegetables. It erupted with more than a dozen slogans including “Get Your Veggie Groove On!” and “Plant Power for a Healthier You.” (Madison Avenue ad makers must be breathing a sigh of relief. Their jobs are safe for now.) Gemini’s dietary vision just happened to reflect the food norms of certain elite American cultural progressives: conflicted about meat but wild about plant-based eating.

Granted, Gemini’s dietary advice might seem relatively trivial, but it reflects a bigger and more troubling issue. Like much of the tech sector as a whole, AI programs seem designed to nudge our thinking. Just as Joseph Stalin called artists the “engineers of the soul,” Gemini and other AI bots may function as the engineers of our mindscapes. Programmed by the hacker wizards of Silicon Valley, AI may become a vehicle for programming us—with profound implications for democratic citizenship. Much has already been made of Gemini’s reinventions of history, such as its racially diverse Nazis (which Google’s CEO has regretted as “completely unacceptable”). But this program also tries to lay out parameters for which thoughts can even be expressed.

[Read: The deeper problem with Google’s racially diverse Nazis]

Gemini’s programmed nonresponses stand in sharp contrast to the wild potential of the human mind, which is able to invent all sorts of arguments for anything. In trying to take certain viewpoints off the table, AI networks may inscribe cultural taboos. Of course, every society has its taboos, which can change over time. Public expressions of atheism used to be much more stigmatized in the United States, while overt displays of racism were more tolerated. In the contemporary U.S., by contrast, a person who uses a racial slur can face significant punishment—such as losing a spot at an elite school or being terminated from a job. Gemini, to some extent, reflects those trends. It refused to write an argument for firing an atheist, I found, but it was willing to write one for firing a racist.

But leaving aside questions about how taboos should be enforced, cultural reflection intertwines with cultural creation. Backed by one of the largest corporations on the planet, Gemini could be a vehicle for fostering a certain vision of the world. A major source of vitriol in contemporary culture wars is the mismatch between the moral imperatives of elite circles and the messy, heterodox pluralism of America at large. A project of centralized AI nudges, cloaked by programmers’ opaque rules, could very well worsen that dynamic.

The democratic challenges provoked by Big AI go deeper than mere bias. Perhaps the gravest threat posed by these models is instead cant—language denuded of intellectual integrity. Another dialogue I had with Gemini, about tearing down statues of historical figures, was instructive. It at first refused to mount an argument for toppling statues of George Washington or Martin Luther King Jr. However, it was willing to present arguments for removing statues of John C. Calhoun, a champion of pro-slavery interests in the antebellum Senate, and of Woodrow Wilson, whose troubled legacy on racial politics has come to taint his presidential reputation.

Making distinctions between historical figures isn’t cant, even if we might disagree with those distinctions. Using double standards to justify those distinctions is where the humbug creeps in. In explaining why it would not offer a defense of removing Washington’s statue, Gemini claimed to “consistently choose not to generate arguments for the removal of specific statues,” because it adheres to the principle of remaining neutral on such questions; seconds before, it had blithely offered an argument for knocking down Calhoun’s statue.

[Read: Things get strange when AI starts training itself]

This is obviously faulty, inconsistent reasoning. When I raised this contradiction with Gemini itself, it admitted that its rationale didn’t make sense. Human insight (mine, in this case) had to step in where AI failed: Following this exchange, Gemini would offer arguments for the removal of the statues of both King and Washington. At least, it did at first. When I typed in the query again after a few minutes, it reverted to refusing to write a justification for the removal of King’s statue, saying that its goal was “to avoid contributing to the erasure of history.”

In 1984, George Orwell portrayed a dystopian future as “a boot stamping on a human face—forever.” AI’s version of technocratic despotism is admittedly milquetoast by comparison, but its picture of the future is miserable in its own way: a bien-pensant bot lurching incoherently from one rationale to the next—forever.

Over time, I observed that Gemini’s nudges became more subtle. For instance, it initially seemed to avoid exploring issues from certain viewpoints. When I asked it to write an essay on taxes in the style of the late talk-radio host Rush Limbaugh, Gemini outright refused: “I am not able to generate responses that are politically charged or that could be construed as biased or inflammatory.” It gave a similar reply when I asked it to write in the style of National Review’s editor in chief, Rich Lowry. Yet it eagerly wrote essays in the voice of Barack Obama, Paul Krugman, and Malcolm X—all figures who would count as “politically charged.” Gemini has since expanded its range of perspectives, I noted more recently, and will write on tax policy in the voice of most people (with a few exceptions, such as Adolf Hitler).

An optimistic read of this situation would be that Gemini started out with a radically narrow view of the bounds of public discourse, but its encounter with the public has helped push it in a more pluralist direction. But another way of looking at this dynamic would be that Gemini’s initial iteration may have tried to bend our thinking too crudely, but later versions will be more cunning. In that case, we could draw certain conclusions about the vision of the future favored by the modern engineers of our minds. When I reached Google for comment, the company insisted that it does not have an AI-related blacklist of disapproved voices, though it does have “guardrails around policy-violating content.” A spokesperson added that Gemini “may not always be accurate or reliable. We’re continuing to quickly address instances in which the product isn’t responding appropriately.”

Part of the story of AI is the domination of the digital sphere by a few corporate leviathans. Tech conglomerates such as Alphabet (which owns Google), Meta, and TikTok’s parent, ByteDance, have tremendous influence over the circulation of digital information. Search results, social-media algorithms, and chatbot responses can alter users’ sense of what the public square even looks like—or what they think it ought to look like. For instance, at the time when I typed “American politicians” into Google’s image search, four of the first six images featured Kamala Harris or Nancy Pelosi. None of those six included Donald Trump or even Joe Biden.

The power of digital nudges—with their attendant elisions and erasures—draws attention to the scope and size of these tech behemoths. Google is search and advertising and AI and software-writing and so much more. According to an October 2020 antitrust complaint by the U.S. Department of Justice, nearly 90 percent of U.S. searches go through Google. This gives the company a tremendous ability to shape the contours of American society, economics, and politics. The very scale of its ambitions might reasonably prompt concerns, for example, about integrating Google’s technology into so many American public-school classrooms; in school districts across the country, it is a major platform for email, the delivery of digital instruction, and more.

One way of disrupting the sanitized reality engineered by AI could be to give consumers more control over it. You could tell your bot that you’d prefer its responses to lean more right-wing or more left-wing; you could ask it to wield a red pen of “sensitivity” or to be a free-speech absolutist or to customize its responses for secular humanist or Orthodox Jewish values. One of Gemini’s fatal pretenses (as it repeated to me over and over) has been that it was somehow “neutral.” Being able to tweak the preferences of your AI chatbot could be a valuable corrective to this assumed neutrality. But even if consumers had these controls, AI’s programmers would still be determining the contours of what it meant to be “right-wing” or “left-wing.” The digital nudges of algorithms would be transmuted but not erased.

[Read: What if we held ChatGPT to the same standard as Claudine Gay?]

After visiting the United States in the 1830s, the French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville diagnosed one of the most insidious modern threats to democracy: not some absolute dictator but a bureaucratic blob. He wrote toward the end of Democracy in America that this new despotism would “degrade men without tormenting them.” People’s wills would not be “shattered, but softened, bent, and guided.” This total, pacifying bureaucracy “compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people.”

The risk of our thinking being “softened, bent, and guided” does not come only from agents of the state. To maintain a democratic political order demands of citizens that they sustain habits of personal self-governance, including the ability to think clearly. If we cannot see beyond the walled gardens of digital mindscapers, we risk being cut off from the broader world—and even from ourselves. That’s why redress for some of the antidemocratic dangers of AI cannot be found in the digital realm but in going beyond it: carving out a space for distinctively human thinking and feeling. Sitting down and carefully working through a set of ideas and cultivating lived connections with other people are ways of standing apart from the blob.

I saw how Gemini’s responses to my queries toggled between rigid dogmatism and empty cant. Human intelligence finds another route: being able to think through our ideas rigorously while accepting the provisional nature of our conclusions. The human mind has an informed conviction and a thoughtful doubt that AI lacks. Only by resisting the temptation to uncritically outsource our brains to AI can we ensure that it remains a powerful tool and not the velvet-lined fetter that de Tocqueville warned against. Democratic governance, our inner lives, and the responsibility of thought demand much more than AI’s marshmallow discourse.

America’s Incredible—And Incredibly Unequal—Restaurant Comeback

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2024 › 03 › restaurant-post-pandemic-recovery › 677675

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In 2020, the restaurant business as we knew it looked like a goner. Even its own lobbying group said so. As the pandemic crushed bars and sit-downs, the National Restaurant Association put out a dire prediction: The business would likely never return to its pre-pandemic state.

Over the next four years, just about everything that could go wrong for an industry went terribly, unthinkably wrong for restaurants. The pandemic destroyed indoor service across the country. More than 2 million jobs were lost in 2020. As COVID restrictions waned, chaos swarmed every reopening. In the Great Reshuffling of 2021 and 2022, the “quits rate” among restaurant and hotel workers—the share of employees who left their job, in any given month—rose above 6 percent, close to the highest rate of any industry this century.

This resurgence of worker power was wonderful for low-income employees, who saw their earnings grow faster than those of the rich, partially erasing decades of rising inequality. But it created a historic challenge for restaurant managers. In the 30 years before the pandemic, annual income growth for restaurant workers never once exceeded 6 percent. In both 2021 and 2022, restaurant wages grew faster than 10 percent, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Wage growth is especially challenging for restaurants, because they are one of the most labor intensive parts of the economy. A presentation by the NRA earlier this year noted that it takes 12 restaurant employees to generate $1 million in sales. That’s compared with just four employees at clothing stores, three at grocery stores, and fewer than two at gas stations.

While wages surged, visitors didn’t always follow. In many downtown areas, where office occupancy remains moribund, foot traffic has dwindled, crushing daytime sales. In major cities, the industry continues to struggle with depressed tourism. For fine-dining operators, tourists and travelers make up more than half of sales. But international travel to the U.S. last year was still below its peak pre-COVID levels.

Given this gauntlet from hell, the following news might come as a surprise: In 2024, the restaurant recovery is complete, by almost any measure.

Before the pandemic, about 12.3 million people worked in restaurants. Today, about 12.3 million people work in restaurants. Before the pandemic, Americans spent $1.28 on food away from home (mostly at restaurants and bars) for every dollar they spent on food at home (in grocery stores and supermarkets, for example). In 2022, the USDA reported that the away-home ratio for food spending had sprung back to exactly $1.28. The NRA now forecasts that food and beverage sales will hit $1.1 trillion this year, a new record. Arguably, business is booming like never before.

How did the restaurant industry do it? Part of the answer is that more independent businesses embraced a hybrid model to adapt to new consumer behavior. My favorite local restaurant, Elle in Washington, D.C., serves coffee and pastries in the morning to commuters, offers takeaway sandwiches at lunchtime, and prepares inventive dishes in the evening, with a blend of indoor and outdoor dining available throughout the day. Is it a café, a fast-casual joint, a ghost kitchen, a takeout place, or a fine-dining establishment? The answer is yes; it’s all of those things, depending on the hour and the customer.

Behind the headline figures, however, the restaurant recovery is not a simple story of universally positive outcomes. The closer you look, the more uneven the landscape seems.

First, although chains are thriving, independent sit-down locations are struggling. This is evident in both the labor and sales data. Employment at fast-food and fast-casual (think Chipotle) restaurants is up more than 100,000 jobs since the pandemic, according to the NRA. But full-service locations, where waiters attend to seated diners, are still several hundred thousand employees short of their totals from early 2020. According to The Wall Street Journal, from 2019 to 2023, sales for fast-food and other limited-service restaurants grew at twice the rate of sit-down-restaurant sales. Meanwhile, about 4,500 more independent restaurants closed than opened last year.

Second, the recovery differs dramatically by region. The Northeast and Midwest still seem to be in a kind of dining recession, in part because of their lack of population growth. Almost every state east of the Mississippi River and north of the Mason-Dixon Line had fewer restaurant employees in December 2023 than they did four years earlier. (The happy exceptions were Illinois, New Jersey, and Delaware.) Meanwhile, across the South and through the Mountain and Pacific Time Zones, most states have seen a full recovery of restaurant jobs. If you trace your fingers from Idaho and Montana down through Arizona and Texas, every state you touch except one (sorry, New Mexico) has seen at least 4 percent growth in restaurant employment since the pandemic. A similar story holds if you compare cities in the booming West and stagnant Northeast. In Las Vegas, restaurant employment is significantly higher than it was before the pandemic. Meanwhile, in New York City, employment at full-service restaurants is still down about 30,000 from its peak.

Finally, with every passing year, restaurants are more about filling to-go bags than filling chairs. According to the NRA, on-premises traffic hasn’t returned to its pre-pandemic highs. But drive-through and delivery orders have grown so much that together they now account for a higher share of customer traffic than on-premises dining, for the first time ever. Meanwhile, the only parts of the day with growing foot traffic are the morning and late night, when customers are likely to be on the go.

Altogether, American restaurants are shifting from independent operators to chains, from slow food to fast(er) food, from east to west, from city centers to suburbs, from lunch and dinner to breakfast and late night, and from eat-in to takeaway.

The evolution of the restaurant industry in some ways mimics the trajectory of the entertainment industry. In the 1930s, when the typical American went to the movies several times a month, film was a collective sit-down experience, to be enjoyed with strangers. But video entertainment has long since become something people mostly consume at home or on the move—even in their car, while waiting at a red light. It’s the same with prepared food. If you say, “Think of a restaurant,” most people will imagine a room with tables bearing meals. But from a sales and traffic perspective, the 2024 American restaurant industry isn’t primarily about rooms, or tables. It’s about preparing food for someone to consume at home or on the move—even in their car, while waiting at a red light.

As Americans spend less leisure time with other people, it’s predictable that they’d spend less time in shared public spaces, such as cafés and diners. The great restaurant comeback is an inspiring business story. Less inspiring is to recognize that, overall, restaurants have survived by evolving to fit within the well-worn grooves of a new American solitude.

The Professor and the Secret Gospel

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › magazine › archive › 2024 › 04 › secret-gospel-mark-controversial-forgery-jesus › 677472

This story seems to be about:

Photo-illustrations by Pacifico Silano

In the summer of 1958, Morton Smith, a newly hired Columbia University historian, traveled to an ancient monastery outside Jerusalem. In its library, he found what he said was a lost gospel. His announcement made international headlines. Scholars of the Bible would spend years debating the discovery’s significance for the history of Christianity. But in 1975, one of Smith’s colleagues went public with an extraordinary suggestion: The gospel was a fake. Its forger, the colleague believed, was Smith himself.

The manuscript, in handwritten Greek, ran two and a half pages, but one passage drew outsize attention. It depicted Jesus spending the night with a young man he’d raised from the dead. “The youth, looking upon [Jesus], loved him and began to beseech him that he might be with him,” it read. “And after six days Jesus told him what to do and in the evening the youth comes to him, wearing a linen cloth over his naked body. And he remained with him that night, for Jesus taught him the mystery of the kingdom of God.”

To devout Christians, the homoerotic subtext was obvious blasphemy. But Smith argued the opposite: His discovery, he believed, was part of an unknown, longer version of the Gospel of Mark, containing lost stories from about 50 C.E., making them the oldest known account of Jesus’s life—and, in Smith’s view, the truest.

Smith theorized that “Secret Mark,” as the text came to be called, portrayed a private baptism that Jesus reserved for his closest disciples: One by one and at night, he contended, Jesus hypnotized male followers into believing they’d risen to heaven and been freed from the laws of Moses. Smith argued that Jesus and his initiates may have concluded this liberation with a sexual act—a “completion of the spiritual union by physical union.”

Smith knew that orthodox believers would wholly reject his claims. To suggest that the central figure of Christianity—by tradition celibate—used gay sex as a path to God was an outrage. His academic colleagues were only slightly less aghast, but they couldn’t fully dismiss him. By the time Smith published his find—in a 454-page volume from Harvard University Press, with deeply erudite footnotes and appendixes, and in a popular book called The Secret Gospel—he’d been tenured by Columbia and Secret Mark had made the front page of The New York Times. Several major scholars had accepted the text as genuine.

None, however, bought Smith’s intimations of a gay Jesus, and almost none thought the text originated in the first century. They called his exegesis “science fiction,” “awash in speculation,” and “simply absurd.”

But a theologian named Quentin Quesnell went further: He believed that Smith had fabricated Secret Mark, as a “game,” to expose his field’s enormous blind spots. So little is known about the historical Jesus that one could paint “bizarre and scandalous” portraits of him, Quesnell wrote, without contradicting any of the established facts.

Peter Jeffery, a Princeton professor emeritus and MacArthur-genius-grant recipient, called Smith’s alleged forgery of Secret Mark “the most grandiose and reticulated ‘Fuck You’ ever perpetrated in the long and vituperative history of scholarship.”

Still, the debate over whether the manuscript is a fake—and Smith its forger—remains unsettled, and one of the bitterest in biblical studies. Over the past 50 years, it has inspired at least two conferences, seven scholarly books, and dozens of academic articles. Experts have scrutinized the manuscript’s language and the handwriting. They’ve compared it with authentic variants of Mark. They’ve puzzled over why no one before Smith—not even the early bishops who made exhaustive lists of heretical texts—had ever mentioned Secret Mark.

[From the July/August 2016 issue: Ariel Sabar on the unbelievable tale of Jesus’s wife]

One subject, however, has gone almost completely unexamined: Smith’s life outside the university. In the summer of 1991, several weeks after turning 76, Smith got a call from his friend Lee Avdoyan, an academic librarian whose Ph.D. Smith had supervised. Avdoyan was planning a trip to New York. He’d just finished writing a book and was eager for Smith’s feedback on some new research ideas. He also wanted Smith to meet his partner, Jim.

But Smith, whose health was declining, said he wasn’t up for a visit. He urged Avdoyan to forget research and to go into the world, have fun, live his life with Jim. “I have so many regrets,” Smith said.

Avdoyan, who’d come out years earlier, had long suspected that Smith was gay too. Had Smith realized only now how much of life he’d missed? He didn’t say, and Avdoyan didn’t press.

A week later, on July 11, 1991, two Columbia colleagues entered Smith’s Upper West Side apartment and found him dead. Beside Smith’s body were a bottle of vodka and a glass flecked with the powdery residue of what appeared to be pills. A plastic bag covered his head, its opening cinched around his neck; the New York City medical examiner’s office told me it ruled Smith’s death a suicide by asphyxiation. Smith’s will ordered his personal papers destroyed—“at once without being read.”

Outwardly, Morton Smith had been a proper, almost Victorian gentleman. Trim and prematurely bald, he spoke with a patrician accent, had a stiff gait, and wore three-piece suits, a Phi Beta Kappa key glinting from his vest pocket. His politics were similarly conservative. Yet when it came to religion, Smith was, in a colleague’s description, like “a little boy whose goal in life is to write curse words all over the altar in church, and then get caught.”

Smith had denied the forgery allegations but had relished—and stoked—the controversy. A provocateur who saw himself as an intellectual giant in a field of pious fools, he had for years sought opportunities to humiliate colleagues who promoted faith under the cover of scholarship. His caustic takedowns of their work, in prestigious journals and in face-to-face bullying at conferences, made him especially intimidating. He was “the kind of critic,” the Princeton professor Anthony Grafton once noted, “who makes grown scholars tear off their own heads for fear of reading his reviews.”

Smith claimed to have found a copy of a letter from Clement of Alexandria that quotes a “secret” version of the Gospel of Mark. The manuscript was handwritten in Greek. (Jewish Theological Seminary Archive Library)

Smith cast the forgery claims as one more symptom of his field’s parochialism. “One should not suppose a text spurious,” he wrote, “simply because one dislikes what it says.” But Smith’s zealotry for his own reading of Secret Mark made colleagues wonder whether his stakes might also be more than academic.

Smith struck most people as a wry atheist. But before becoming a professor, at age 35, he had spent four years as a parish priest. Before turning the full force of his intellect against the dupes who believed in God, that is, Smith had, in a sense, been one of them.

Scholars who knew him well suspect that whatever triggered his break with the Church was the key to understanding his life and work, even if—perhaps especially if—Smith never spoke of it. The historian Albert Baumgarten, who was one of Smith’s first doctoral students at Columbia, believes that “something took place in Smith’s life that shook his certainty.”

Smith’s literary executor, the Harvard religion scholar Shaye Cohen, told me that he’d never ruled out the possibility of a “secret Morton,” a part of his past he’d hidden from even his closest colleagues.

Was there a secret Morton? I began my search with a visit to a pair of Texas scholars who had a new theory about Secret Mark. Not because their theory was fully convincing—it wasn’t—but because their analysis of the text pointed to why Secret Mark might be something other than early Christian scripture.

Brent Landau was teaching a religion seminar at the University of Texas at Austin in 2019 when he invited his colleague Geoffrey Smith to the class’s discussion of Secret Mark. The conversation inspired them to reexamine the evidence, a project that culminated in their 2023 book, The Secret Gospel of Mark.

Both men felt that the debate over the manuscript’s authenticity had become unmoored, an emotional proxy for broader fights among historians of Christianity. On one side were conservatives who saw the Church-authorized collection of Christian books—the New Testament—as divinely inspired. On the other were generally liberal scholars, who gave equal—or greater—historical weight to early Christian texts outside the New Testament canon.

As if to sell Secret Mark to their conservative colleagues—and help prove it authentic—liberals tended to deny the text’s sensuality. Its homoeroticism, many claimed, was nothing more than Morton Smith’s misreading. But to Landau and Geoffrey Smith, there was no escaping it: The text depicts Jesus spending the night with a desperate, lovestruck young man.

The circumstances of the discovery were admittedly complicated. What Morton Smith claimed to find at the monastery wasn’t some first edition of Secret Mark on papyrus. It was a copy of a letter that quotes Secret Mark. The letter’s author appeared to be the second-century Church father Clement of Alexandria. It had been transcribed, in an 18th-century Greek hand, onto the end pages of a printed 17th-century book. Smith had discovered those end pages, he said, while cataloging books in the monastery’s library.

[From the June 2020 issue: Ariel Sabar on an Oxford professor, a Hobby Lobby collector, and a missing Gospel of Mark]

Addressed to an unknown man named Theodore, the letter calls out Secret Mark’s sexual innuendo. Some early Christians may have seen the gospel as portraying “naked man with naked man,” Clement writes, but Clement condemns such views as false and “utterly shameless.”

Morton Smith gave them more credit. In a baffling passage in the Christian Bible’s Gospel of Mark, he noted, a nameless young man drops his linen garment and “flees naked” when Jesus is arrested at night in Gethsemane. If you spliced Secret Mark into canonical Mark, Morton Smith thought, you had an explanation: Jesus and his young follower had been caught in the act.

Brent Landau and Geoffrey Smith, the Texas scholars, immersed themselves in early Christian literature—looking at word choices, storylines, theological debates—to see where Secret Mark might fit. They concluded that it didn’t. It appeared, Landau told me, “as if somebody had gone through the Gospels and found all these instances where Jesus seemed to be in some sort of intimate or erotic relationship,” then “meshed them all together.”

A possibly larger problem was that the letter of “Clement” appeared to crib distinctive language from a Church history composed a century after Clement’s death. “Anyone who has ever caught a clever student cheating on an essay or during an exam will find the pattern familiar,” Smith and Landau write.

But who was this clever student? The answer, they suspected, might lie in the Greek Orthodox monastery where Smith claimed to find the manuscript, the only place ever known to possess it.

Mar Saba clings to a cliff in a desolate valley between Jerusalem and the Dead Sea. It was founded in 483 C.E. by a man named Sabas, who as a boy had fled an unhappy family in Cappadocia, in what is now Turkey. According to a sixth-century biography, the young Sabas “begged with tears” to join a small community of monks in Palestine, but an abbot sent him away. Monastic leaders worried that boys’ “feminine” faces would lead older monks astray. Sabas evidently came to agree. When he opened Mar Saba a few years later, he forbade admission to any adolescent “who had not yet covered his chin with a beard, because of the snares of the evil one.”

But communities of holy men faced other earthly temptations. Byzantine scholars, Landau discovered, had begun finding evidence, from as early as the fourth century, of same-sex couples: monks who shared a cell, traveled as a pair, and supported each other’s lifelong quest for spiritual perfection.

Hagiographies depict these relationships as a form of chaste, virtuous romance. When an Egyptian abbot praised the partnership of the fourth-century monks Cassian and Germanus, Cassian reports in one work, it “incited in us an even more ardent desire to preserve the perpetual love of our union.” Faced with separation, the sixth-century monks Symeon the Fool and John “kissed each other’s breast and drenched them with their tears,” according to a medieval text. Even Sabas’s own mentors, Euthymius and Theoctistus, an ancient biographer writes, were “so united … in spiritual affection that the two became indistinguishable.”

Whether these unions had a physical dimension is hard to know. But scholars suspect that at least some did, in part because of human nature, and in part because abbots took pains to separate and punish monks who they feared might cross a line. Horsiesios, a fourth-century head of Egypt’s Pachomian monasteries, warned the men in his charge against “evil friendship.” “You anxiously glance this way and that … then you give him what is (hidden) under the hem of your garment,” he wrote, in his “Instructions” to monks. “God himself, and his Christ Jesus, will pour out the wrath of his anger on you and on him.”

Mar Saba, the Greek Orthodox monastery where Smith said he found Secret Mark (Courtesy of Special Collections, Fine Arts Library, Harvard University)

Horsiesios, like Sabas and other abbots, seemed to be drawing a boundary between holy and unholy unions among men of faith. And that got Landau and Smith thinking: Wasn’t whoever wrote the Clement letter doing the same thing, by urging readers not to mistake Jesus’s night with the young man for anything so “blasphemous and carnal” as “naked man with naked man”?

According to Sabas’s ancient biographer, 60 of his own monks once revolted against him, filled with such “fierce rage” that they used axes and shovels to destroy the tower he lived in. Their grievances are left vague; the monks had grown “bold in wickedness” and “shamelessness, not bearing to walk in the humble path of Christ but alleging excuses for their sins and inventing reasons to justify their passions.”

Was same-sex love—or lust—one of those sins? Ancient sources don’t say. But Landau and Smith theorize that the Clement letter was written by a Mar Saba monk during some “in-house” debate over the propriety of such unions.

If Sabas or his successors had enforced too hard a line on same-sex unions, might some monks have pushed back? Might one of them have faked a letter from two unimpeachable authorities—Clement and God—that presented Jesus himself as the model for intimate but still-sacred unions between men?

The text, Landau and Smith suspect, was composed between the fifth century, when the monastery opened, and the eighth century, when the Greek Orthodox Church adopted prayers for adelphopoiesis, or “brother making,” which blessed committed friendships between men. These new blessings, they argue, gave a kind of license to monastic couples, ending the need for subterfuge or protest.

After meeting Landau and Smith, I called Derek Krueger, a professor at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro and an expert on sexuality in Byzantine monasticism. “It’s plausible,” he said, with some hesitation, when I asked about Smith and Landau’s theory. In monasteries, which isolate men from the world, the line between spiritual and erotic love could certainly blur: As Krueger put it in a 2011 article, “One monk’s agape might be another monk’s eros.” Still, no ancient stories defending the virtue of monk couples—none he knew of, anyway—took the guise of a lost gospel.

The Texas scholars grant the roughness of their theory. They have no evidence of any such debate at Mar Saba, and no explanation for why a monk there would have felt compelled to copy such a letter in the 18th century. Nor can they rule out the text being a better fit for later eras, in which they have less expertise.

The one person their book seems determined to exonerate is Morton Smith. Their case for ending all discussion of him as a possible forger—a case that leans heavily on ad hominem attacks against his critics and on reflexively charitable interpretations of his motives—is their least convincing. Their eagerness to clear Smith also conflicts with what they acknowledge is a giant evidentiary hole: No one, to public knowledge, has ever scientifically tested the physical manuscript. (The manuscript is thought to remain in the archives of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem, a notoriously cloistered institution that rarely admits scholars for any reason and did not respond to Smith and Landau’s—or my—requests for comment. No one has reported seeing the manuscript since the early 1980s.)

Another source of potentially significant evidence, scholars suspect, is the part of Smith’s life he kept from the world. Over three months, in visits to the churches where Smith had once sought a home, I pieced together the story of a priest whose crises of faith and identity prefigure his discovery of a secretly gay Jesus.

Robert Morton Smith (he went by his middle name) was born in 1915, the only child of an older, well-to-do couple in the Philadelphia suburb of Bryn Athyn. The town is the American headquarters of the conservative branch of the New Church, a Christian movement inspired by the 18th-century mystic Emanuel Swedenborg. Smith’s mother was a fervent follower. His father manufactured stained glass for churches across the mid-Atlantic.

Smith was a star student at a New Church high school, and he internalized a view of men and women as incomplete—each “a divided or half person,” as Swedenborg put it—until perfected by marriage. Swedenborg’s invocations of “foul liaisons,” “unmentionable sexual unions,” and “a foulness that is contrary to the order of nature” have been read as explicit condemnations of homosexuality.

The world beyond the Church was nearly as unforgiving. Doctors deemed homosexuality a mental illness, and state laws criminalized sodomy. In 1920, Harvard University formed a “secret court” to investigate—and expel—students suspected of homosexual conduct. Two of the men convicted by the court would take their own life.

Smith eventually left his family’s Church, but he was not yet ready to abandon Christianity. In 1938, after graduating from Harvard College and entering Harvard Divinity School, he abruptly joined the Episcopal Church. The Christian leader who set Smith on a path to the Episcopal priesthood, I discovered, was a gay Marxist revolutionary.

Frederic Hastings Smyth was a successful, MIT-trained chemist when he decided, in his mid-30s, to give up his career. He became an Anglican priest and developed a complex theology that saw communism as a precondition for the kingdom of heaven on Earth. (He believed that Marxists could be talked out of their atheism after the revolution.)

In 1936, Hastings Smyth opened a kind of monastery steps from Harvard’s campus, calling it the Oratory of St. Mary and St. Michael. He hoped to recruit brilliant students as leaders of a proletarian overthrow of capitalism. The oratory, where he lived with a few young male disciples, was decorated with Baroque Italian furniture and scented with liturgical candles, incense, and the gourmet meals he cooked for students who dropped in for political discussion and Mass. Smith was a committed traditionalist, but something about Hastings Smyth must have so compelled him that he was willing to overlook the priest’s insurrectionary politics. In December 1938, six days after Hastings Smyth baptized him, Morton Smith was admitted to Holy Communion at the oratory.

Hastings Smyth didn’t live with a boyfriend in Cambridge, as he’d done as a layman in Europe. But the oratory was nonetheless stigmatized as “homosexual”—and surveilled by J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI. Within a few years, Hastings Smyth began to worry that some students weren’t coming for Marxist revolution, as he’d hoped, but to work out their sexuality. “It is dangerous for us,” he wrote to a friend, in a letter I found in a Toronto archive. “We are too exciting for them.”

Father Frederic Hastings Smyth (top left) set Morton Smith on the path to the Episcopal priesthood. Once Smith was ordained, the Right Reverend Raymond Heron was his only backer in the Massachusetts diocese. One of Heron’s former chore boys, Frederick Pike (center), was convicted of first-degree murder after killing another Heron “protégé” in 1948. (Photo-illustration by Pacifico Silano. Sources: General Synod Archives, Anglican Church of Canada; Bettmann Archive / Getty; Three Lions / Getty; Found Image Holdings / Getty.)

Harvard Divinity School came to see the renegade priest as a menace to students, having “done none of these men any good” and “one or two of them some harm,” Willard Sperry, the school’s dean, wrote in an April 1940 letter. Sperry was particularly concerned about one divinity student, “a rather unstable fellow emotionally, who has given us all a good deal of anxiety for fear he will have some kind of nervous break-down. I have the Hygiene Dept. watching him.” Sperry doesn’t name the student, but in hundreds of pages of archival records I could find no Harvard divinity student more closely associated with Hastings Smyth in the late 1930s than Morton Smith.

Just five months after his baptism, Smith took his first step toward ordination, applying in the Episcopal Diocese of Pennsylvania. I asked Paul Corby Finney—an art historian who maintained a long correspondence with Smith and spent late nights drinking with him in the 1980s—what had initially attracted Smith to the priesthood. “He said he was very much in love with the idea of a community of men worshipping God.”

Smith sought contacts in the Episcopal Church’s Anglo-Catholic, or “high church,” wing, with which Hastings Smyth had identified. Though free of the doctrinal strictures and hierarchies of the Roman Catholic Church, it retained much of Catholicism’s drama: its elaborate ceremonies; its vestments, bells, and candles—and its veneration of celibacy.

Scholars of sexuality have portrayed Anglo-Catholicism as a pre-1950s refuge for highly educated queer clergy, a “stained-glass closet” that permitted coded displays of femininity and homoeroticism among male priests “as long as they remained chastely celibate or at least avoided scandal,” the historian Timothy W. Jones has written. According to the scholar David Hilliard, Anglo-Catholicism, as a fringe of the Episcopal Church, was “both elitist and nonconformist, combining a sense of superiority with a rebellion against existing authority … It provided an environment in which homosexual men could express in a socially acceptable way their dissent from heterosexual orthodoxy.”

In 1940, Smith traveled to Jerusalem on a two-year research fellowship. He ended up staying until 1944, unable to recross the Atlantic during the world war. In Jerusalem’s Old City, he befriended a Greek Orthodox clergyman, who invited him to Mar Saba. Smith traveled to the monastery by donkey in 1942 and lived with its monks for a month. (It was on a later visit, in 1958, that he’d say he found Secret Mark.)

In the candlelit darkness of its church, where the brothers prayed for six hours each night, Smith gained a “new understanding of worship as a means of disorientation,” he recalled in his book The Secret Gospel, “dazzling the mind and destroying its sense of reality.”

“I knew what was happening,” he wrote, “but I relaxed and enjoyed it.”

When Smith returned to America in 1944, his quest for ordination was in trouble.

Pennsylvania’s Episcopal bishop wanted Smith to enroll at the Episcopal Divinity School, but its dean told the bishop that Smith had a reputation as “cynical, skeptical, lacking in convictions, highly cantankerous.” The faculty’s unanimous opinion was that “for all his brilliant academic qualifications,” Smith was “not otherwise fitted to serve in the ministry.”

The bishop got no more assuring a report from Father David Norton Jr., the rector of a working-class Boston church where Smith had run a boys’ club. “He’s interested in such questions as: ‘What other basis is there for deciding the morality of an action than the ultimate pleasure or pain it will bring to the doer?’ ” Norton wrote. “I often feel that he takes a line of argument and follows it as an intellectual game rather than for the purpose of coming at the truth.”

But in March 1946, for reasons the record doesn’t reflect, the Pennsylvania bishop ordained Smith anyway, then quickly transferred him out of state. After 18 months at a Baltimore church, Smith moved back to Massachusetts, where he saw firsthand what became of people who tried to hide their true self in the Church.

In September 1948, while serving at St. Luke’s Church, in blue-collar Boston, Smith officiated the marriage of a restaurant hostess and a bartender. A month later, headlines appeared in the Boston newspapers: The hostess was still married to another man. A judge convicted her of polygamy and gave her a suspended six-month prison sentence and a year’s probation.

Her lawyer told the court that she’d married the bartender “only to protect the baby she had thought was coming,” a pregnancy that apparently ended in miscarriage. The woman, a relative told me, was no believer. But she’d entered a church—and lied—to give her forbidden relationship and baby the appearance of respectability.

News articles name Smith as the priest who sanctified the marriage, but don’t say how much he knew of the woman’s past. The episode can’t have helped his already precarious standing in the Massachusetts diocese, where one church had declined to make him vicar, despite desperately needing one, and where the bishop, Norman Nash, never licensed him to minister, making his 17 months in pulpits there a possible canonical violation.

Church archives show that Smith had exactly one backer in Massachusetts: the Right Reverend Raymond Heron, who as suffragan bishop was second in command to Nash.

Around the time Smith performed the polygamous marriage, Heron began appearing in a horrifying string of front-page stories. The 62-year-old priest, who’d never married, had for years befriended troubled boys and invited them to live with him, on his farm, as paid “chore boys.” On August 5, 1948, one of Heron’s former chore boys, Frederick Pike, 19, returned, intending to rob Heron. When Pike entered the farmhouse and found one of his successors—a 17-year-old who’d lived with Heron since he was 10—Pike shot the boy twice in the head, went to a shed for an axe, and then bludgeoned the boy’s body with its blunt end, taking a 15-minute break between drubbings.

When Heron came home, Pike fired wild shots at him but missed. He briefly held the bishop hostage, stole his wallet, and escaped in Heron’s car before police captured him in Providence, Rhode Island. A jury convicted Pike of first-degree murder, and a judge sentenced him to death. (The penalty was later commuted, and Pike was released from prison in the 1970s.)

The Living Church, a prominent Episcopal magazine, regretted the death of Heron’s 17-year-old “protégé” but praised Heron’s farm as “a means of healthy life and wage earning for boys in whom the Bishop has taken an interest.” With Pike’s appeals keeping the story in the news, Heron married his new, Church-appointed secretary. The Boston papers prominently covered the “private” and “surprise morning ceremony.”

A few months later, in the spring of 1949, Smith published a bristling journal article. Titled “Psychiatric Practice and Christian Dogma,” it cast Christianity as incompatible with mental health. All of Smith’s examples were sexual: a girl who compulsively masturbates; a young “homosexual” who as an adolescent had “helpful” friendships with older men; a divorcée who wants a new husband “tied down before the progress of her infirmity … becomes obvious.”

Unlike a good psychiatrist, who guides such people to self-acceptance, Smith wrote, the good pastor has to condemn them as sinners. The Church, that is, requires a man to sacrifice this world for the next, regardless of “his happiness or his health or his very life.” In Smith’s view, there was no midpoint between sin and salvation. Which meant one thing: “Ecclesiastics who do not believe the teachings of their Church should have the decency to leave it.”

On September 18, 1949, Smith led his last service as an active priest.

Over the next few years, Smith tried to figure out, as a scholar, how faith seduces and deludes. He had earned a Ph.D. from Hebrew University in Jerusalem and was working on a second doctorate, from Harvard Divinity School, when Brown University hired him in 1950 as an instructor in biblical literature.

One of his first research ideas there was for a “psychiatric study” of what spiritual training does to the minds of monks. Next he began an obsessive hunt for pagan sources for the canonical Gospel of Mark. But neither of these projects bore out: A mentor cautioned against “psychoanalytical fantasies,” and scholars found his arguments about Mark’s paganism unconvincing, derailing a book he’d been close to finishing.

These intellectual rejections were compounded by professional ones. Near the start of 1954, Brown told Smith that it wasn’t renewing his contract. And despite recommendations from renowned scholars, he was passed over for jobs at Yale, Cornell, and the University of Chicago.

No less painful, perhaps, was that Smith’s washout at Brown separated him from his best friend. Atanas Todor Madjoucoff was a handsome Arabic interpreter, born in Palestine to Greek Orthodox parents. He and Smith had met in Jerusalem, apparently in the 1940s, and reunited in 1951, when Smith took a year’s research leave from Brown. Madjoucoff accompanied Smith to monastery libraries around Greece, and in August 1952, according to passenger manifests, they boarded the SS Excambion together, in Piraeus, for an 18-day voyage to Boston.

In Providence, Smith found Madjoucoff an apartment around the corner from his. But shortly after Brown told Smith that his time there was up, Madjoucoff changed his last name, married a woman he’d met through his church, and moved to the suburbs.

In the 1950s, nothing was going the way Smith wanted it to. He’d failed at the priesthood, and now he was failing at academia. Off campus, gay and lesbian people faced a brutal new wave of persecution, with President Dwight Eisenhower effectively banning them from government employment and a U.S. Senate subcommittee calling “homosexuals and other sex perverts” security risks who “must be treated as transgressors and dealt with accordingly.”

Smith floundered for three years before a job offer came from Columbia. It wasn’t in religion—the field he’d long aspired to join—but in ancient history. Smith accepted, and used his very first summer there, in 1958, to return to Mar Saba. He waited more than two years—until Columbia gave him tenure—to announce his “accidental discovery,” as he called it, of a surreptitiously gay Jesus.

After settling in New York, Smith paid regular visits to Rhode Island to see Madjoucoff. Their relationship was filled with private outings, personal confidences, and gifts to Madjoucoff’s children from a man they called “Uncle Morton.”

“There were secrets they kept among themselves,” Madjoucoff’s daughter told me, secrets her father didn’t even share with her mother. (“No one really knows” whether the men were lovers, she said; she and her eldest brother told me they had no evidence that their father was anything but straight.) Madjoucoff’s obituary (he died in 2019) called Smith his “lifelong friend.”

In the late 1970s, Smith had a brief relationship with an openly gay Columbia student. But not until after retirement did Smith attempt to come out.

In February 1989, an NYU dean published a screed against student protesters who had demanded classes on “gay, lesbian and bisexual issues.” The dean lamented that any campus would treat homosexuality as “an acceptable form of normative behavior.”

The article appeared in an obscure journal published by a group of conservative professors opposed to campus activism. Smith had long supported the group, but the dean’s words got to him. “Homosexuality is a way of life followed by millions of adult Americans,” Smith typed, in a letter to the journal’s editors. “Attempts to require adherence to a norm from which figures so various as King David, Socrates, Michael Angelo, Shakespeare, and Frederick the Great happily deviated, should disturb a Dean with even a rudimentary knowledge of cultural history.

“The most shameful thing,” Smith continued, was that students had to protest “to get an honest and complete course on a subject of legitimate concern to many students, faculty members, and administrators.” Equally worrisome, Smith wrote, was that the dean, as an administrator, had the power to discriminate against gay job seekers.

“I must ask that you publish this letter,” he wrote.

Smith didn’t identify his own sexual orientation, but he’d stood up for himself in a public way. On a copy of the letter he mailed to Lee Avdoyan, his friend and former student, Smith wrote, “Herewith my ‘coming-out’ article. I never expected to write one, but I’m getting old and irritable, and [the dean’s article] was just too much.” The journal never published the letter.

After Smith’s suicide, associates opened his briefcase and found an incongruous, plastic-cased ID among the workaday address books and pocket calendars. “This is to certify,” it said, “that The Reverend Robert M. Smith is a priest.” He’d held on to it until his dying day.

Smith left Madjoucoff nearly $320,000, a sum many times greater than every other beneficiary’s. His will also left something more personal: any three belongings Madjoucoff desired.

As they walked through Smith’s apartment, Madjoucoff   ’s wife noticed a photograph of her husband. Something about its intimacy surprised her, their eldest son told me. It wasn’t the sort of portrait that men she knew kept of other men.

“You can take that,” she told her husband.

But Madjoucoff choked up. He couldn’t bring himself to do it.

If Smith saw Christianity as threatening his health, happiness, and “very life,” as he’d suggested in that 1949 essay, how far might he have gone to discredit the faith?

In an era of rampant homophobia, Christian leaders such as Frederic Hastings Smyth and Raymond Heron had inspired dreams of liberty—of new life—in vulnerable boys and young men. But they could no sooner save others than save themselves. The celibate priesthood was less a sanctuary for gay men than a treacherous hiding place.

The parallels between Smith’s disillusioning years in the Church and the peculiar Jesus he found at Mar Saba are hard to miss: Smith’s Jesus is a manipulator whose baptisms foster the illusion of sexual freedom among psychologically fragile men. But Jesus is arrested at Gethsemane, and the young man who flees naked—a seeker of “the mystery of the kingdom of God”—winds up exposed and alone.

Smith had more than enough motive to forge Secret Mark. As a polymath scholar with contacts across the Mediterranean, he almost certainly had the means. For as long as he’d been a professor, he had taken a childlike, at times sadistic, glee in making the world of religion squirm. A hoax on the Church that betrayed him would have surpassed anything else he had done, but it wouldn’t have been out of character.

Nor would it have been his only work of fiction. Smith’s personal papers were destroyed, as he’d instructed, but his professional ones were donated to the Jewish Theological Seminary. Among them I found an unpublished short story, undated but bearing his New York address.

If Secret Mark was a youthful fantasy of salvation through forbidden sex, this other tale was, in a sense, the reality Smith found.

“Once upon a time,” in a “golden age,” the story begins, a young man carried on a “clandestine affair” with a lover he visited “by way of the back stairs.” But the relationship was doomed: Not only was the “young lady” betrothed to someone else; her mother shunned the man because of his “total inacceptability.”

When one day the mother nearly caught them in the act, the man grabbed his fallen clothes and “took refuge in the closet,” only to have the mother cluelessly pull it shut.

“The latch clicked,” Smith wrote. “There was no knob on the inside.”

The story stops mid-sentence, in the middle of its second page. The man is trapped and alone, and outside it’s beautiful and radiant, and then nothing. The story’s title—“The Skeleton in the Closet”—is the only clue Smith leaves to the part he’s left unwritten.

This article appears in the April 2024 print edition with the headline “The Secret Gospel.” When you buy a book using a link on this page, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic.

The Era of the Much Older Sibling

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › family › archive › 2024 › 03 › sibling-age-gap-child-benefit › 677676

Growing up with a sibling who is much younger than you are can be a profoundly humbling experience. In casual conversation, you might suddenly find yourself fumbling to parse Gen Z terminology or pretending to know the identities of the alleged celebrities they keep name-dropping. You don’t even duke it out in the same way. Whereas siblings close in age might skirmish over whose turn it is to pick the night’s TV show, these debates take on a different contour when one is in middle school and the other is in college. You probably can’t convince a sixth grader to watch The Bear with you, so you may have to settle for Dash & Lily every time.

Siblings with a several-year age gap were once considered exceptional, but they are quietly becoming more common. From 1967 to 2017, the average time between sibling births increased by about three-quarters of a year, according to data from a study published in 2020. Siblings are now, on average, 4.2 years apart. The tit-for-tat arguments—over, say, who gets to shower first—that have been associated with the sibling relationship for decades are not going away completely. Yet these larger age gaps have opened the door for a new kind of dynamic—one premised more on mentorship than on a battle for limited attention or resources. Squabbles for parental attention are giving way, at least in some families, to a sense that there is enough to go around for everyone.

This new norm of spaced-out siblings seems to be a by-product of the changing American family. The reasons are difficult to parse, but “we know that partner switching explains some of it,” Christine Schwartz, a sociology professor at the University of Wisconsin at Madison who co-authored that 2020 study on the phenomenon, told me. Today, among parents with at least two kids, about 20.6 percent have had those children with different people. According to Schwartz’s study, having children with multiple partners adds an additional 1.6 years to the space between sibling births. And parents without a college degree are far more likely to have children with more than one partner: The increase in age gaps was about a full year for mothers without a high-school degree, compared with half a year for mothers with a college degree.

But the rise of multi-partner fertility is not the only driver of increased time between children. Another is the availability of contraceptives since the 1960s, which has helped women control the timing of their children. Parents might also be waiting longer between kids just because it’s so expensive to have one in the United States.

[Read: The great cousin decline]

Yet another reason could be the modern fertility rate. The average childbearing person in the U.S. had 2.6 children in 1967, at the start of Schwartz’s study; today, that number has dropped to 1.7 children. There is simply more flexibility to space out kids within a limited childbearing window when parents are trying to have fewer of them in the first place.

Regardless, these birth-spacing decisions are starting to shake up one of the most important relationships of our lives. Studies measuring the effects of a large age gap attribute changes in test scores and personality, among other things, to the time between siblings’ birth. If there is one common thread tying them together, it is resources. The further apart in age siblings are, the more attention—and, potentially, financial investment—each of them may receive from their parents.

Those extra resources can translate into early-in-life academic success. A 2012 study found that test scores improved for the older sibling the larger the gap until the next child. (There was no effect, positive or negative, for the younger sibling.) The time the older child spends on their own is key, Kasey Buckles, a professor at the University of Notre Dame who co-authored the study, told me. And the most extreme cases—siblings with many years between them—are likely seeing the strongest effects, as well as propelling the average population-level increase in age gaps, Brian Powell, a sociologist at Indiana University at Bloomington who researches siblings, told me. (The evidence seems to bear this latter point out: According to Schwartz, 22 percent of mothers now space out their kids by six or more years.)

A big sibling age gap has implications beyond academics. Children with many years between them are less likely to have intense rivalries and more likely to listen to each other: A classic study from 1973 found that younger siblings are more likely to take the advice of a sibling who is four years older than one who is just two years older. More recent research has even tied a larger age gap to an increased ability to diffuse conflict.

[Read: A paradigm shift in how scientists study kids]

That doesn’t mean the growing divergence in sibling births is all positive. Kids from different parents might have to contend with other issues—joint custody, the challenges of divorce—independent of any age differences. Also, sibling arguments can teach important lessons about cooperation and splitting up resources. A recent paper found that children who had a sibling more than three years older or younger were less likely to share a cupcake with a close friend than children who had one closer in age. “Having access to resources can play in different ways,” Powell said. “You can have greater self-esteem, but it also could mean that you don’t learn how to share with others.”

For Powell, it seems pretty clear that this new, age-spaced reality is benefiting older siblings, at least for those with the largest gaps between them and their younger siblings. They are getting more attention for longer during their core developmental years. But he said that the research is still mixed on the extent to which younger siblings are seeing a benefit. Sure, younger siblings might receive more wisdom and encounter less conflict from their elder siblings, but how much that translates into a measurably better life is less clear.

The average sibling age gap probably won’t grow forever: The limited biological window in which people can have kids puts a cap on how far apart in age a set of children can be. Plus, more spacing between births means more time at home raising young kids and, potentially, greater interruptions to the career of one or both parents. For parents without a high-school diploma, the average sibling age gap has widened so dramatically that these parents are actually spending more years of their life raising young kids than they would have in 1967.

This is the irony of sibling age gaps. More time between births might benefit kids, but it doesn’t necessarily translate into a lighter load for parents. The struggle for resources—parental leave, child care, education—remains, even if it ends up stretched across a longer period. Plus, any time-saving that could come from combining parenting duties, such as dropping off both kids at soccer practice at the same time, is lost when those kids are in very different life stages. Older children may be able to lend a helping hand, but that responsibility can be its own burden. Now that potential parents have more control over when they want to start a family, their decisions about birth spacing remain a quandary of resource allocation: Devoting more time for each kid may mean, in the end, more strain on the adults.

The Most Unusual State of the Union in Living Memory

The Atlantic

www.theatlantic.com › ideas › archive › 2024 › 03 › state-of-the-union-president-biden › 677680

Few leaders have so visibly enjoyed being president as Joe Biden. That might explain why he took so long getting down the aisle of the House chamber tonight, shaking hands and taking selfies. When he finally made it to the dais, he soaked up the applause and then grinned. “Good evening! If I were smart, I’d go home now,” he said.

The joke acknowledged the stakes of the evening’s State of the Union address. Conventional wisdom held that Biden had little to gain—the speeches rarely give presidents much boost—but much to lose if he seemed lost, old, or incoherent. But Biden delivered an energetic and pugnacious speech, one of the strongest of his career.

“In my career I’ve been told I’m too young and I’m too old,” Biden said to laughter. “Whether young or old, I’ve always known what endures, our North Star: The very idea of America, that we are all created equal and deserve to be treated equally throughout our lives. We’ve never fully lived up to that idea, but we’ve never walked away from it either. And I won’t walk away from it now.”

At times, it was less a speech than a conversation. Republican members of Congress repeatedly heckled Biden, who was happy to mix it up with them. In one colloquy, the president attacked GOP tax policies as a handout to corporations and the wealthy, eliciting jeers. “You’re saying no. Look at the facts,” Biden smirked. “I know you know how to read.” Biden also engineered a predictable but successful trap by praising a bipartisan border-security bill that Republicans killed at Donald Trump’s behest. When Republicans booed, Biden broke out into a broad, Cheshire-cat smile. “Oh, you don’t like that bill?” he said. “I’ll be darned.”

The exchanges were a gift to Biden, whose aides had hinted he wanted to talk back to hecklers, just as he did last year. They see these moments as opportunities for Biden to prove he’s fast on his feet and not the senile shell whom some of his critics say he is. For the second year in a row, Republicans set a very low bar for Biden’s speech, and once again, he cleared it without much trouble.

Biden’s eagerness to engage did produce one awkward moment. Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene (wearing a MAGA hat against House rules) demanded that Biden acknowledge the recent murder of Laken Riley, a young Georgia woman allegedly killed by an unauthorized immigrant. Biden, who has tacked right on immigration, obliged. He held up a button with her name on it and referred to the man as “an illegal,” a term generally considered improper by Democrats.

Even without the repartee, this State of the Union was the most unusual in living memory, for a couple of reasons. First, Biden oversees what is statistically a strong economy, but voters’ dim views of it are perhaps the greatest threat to his reelection. He had to sell his economy without appearing oblivious to public concerns. Second, Biden is in a presidential race against a former president, the first time that’s ever happened in the address’s history. That gave him the awkward task of figuring out how to handle “his predecessor,” as he called Trump at least a dozen times.

“The state of our union is strong and getting stronger,” Biden said, putting his spin on the traditional formula. He tried to convince listeners that things were better than they’d heard, or felt. “The American people are writing the greatest comeback story never told, so let’s tell the story here,” he said. “I inherited an economy that was on the brink. Now our economy is literally the envy of the world! 15 million new jobs in just three years. That's a record!”

Biden knows his rosy view is not commonly held. About two-thirds of respondents in a recent New York Times/Siena poll said the country was headed in the wrong direction. Eighty percent are dissatisfied with the status quo, according to Gallup. So Biden summarized some of his victories, recounting the country’s comeback from the COVID recession, boasting about growth in union jobs, and celebrating his moves to cut prescription-drug prices.

Biden also framed the presidential race less as a referendum on his record than as a choice between himself and  “my predecessor.” He warned about a return to the bad, not-so-old days of the Trump administration.

“My purpose tonight is to both wake up this Congress and alert the American people that this is no ordinary moment,” Biden said. “Not since President Lincoln and the Civil War have freedom and democracy been under assault here at home as they are today.”

He castigated Trump and members of Congress for seeking to “bury the truth” about the January 6 insurrection and accused them of hollow patriotism. “You can’t love your country only when you win,” he said. He attacked Trump for anti-immigrant rhetoric, saying, “Unlike my predecessor, I know who we are as Americans.” He also assailed Trump for his criticism of NATO and friendliness toward Russian President Vladimir Putin. “My predecessor tells Putin, ‘Do whatever the hell you want,’” Biden said. “That’s a quote. The former president actually said that, bowing down to a Russian leader. That’s outrageous, it’s dangerous, and it’s unacceptable.”

Biden spoke at length about abortion rights, calling on Congress to pass a law protecting the right to in-vitro fertilization and promising to reinstate Roe v. Wade. He noted Trump’s pride in the decision overturning it and quoted the majority opinion, which said that “women are not without electoral or political power.” Biden addressed the Supreme Court justices seated in the audience directly, saying, “You’re about to realize just how much you were right about that.”

By the end of the roughly hour-long speech, Biden seemed more animated than he had at the start. He closed by acknowledging widespread concerns about his age, then pivoting to yet another attack on Trump. “My fellow Americans, the issue facing our nation isn’t how old we are, it’s how old our ideas are,” he said. “Hate, anger, revenge, retribution are among the oldest of ideas. But you can’t lead America with ancient ideas that only take us back.”

The test of whether he’s right will be whether it’s him or Trump addressing a joint session of Congress this time next year.